Posted: April 24th, 2025
Case1 – The FTX Collapse – Financial Innovations
Respond this question in 300-450 words: Analyze the causes for the collapse of FTX and identify the red flags of counterparty risk related to investing in crypto companies.
The Case Study is attached and make sure any AI is used.
Important Note:Use the case as your absolute main resource, along with supplemental materials if provided. Your answers should be primarily based on the case. Quote the case precisely to demonstrate thorough reading and analysis. Be specific by referencing the page and section. This ensures you read the case carefully rather than relying on external information. Do not list the case or the supplemental material itself as a reference, as it will trigger the plagiarism tool. You can use external resources and reference them at the end, but your arguments should not be structured around them to stay on subject.
Example of Proper Quoting: If answering question , you should reference specific sections of the case like this: “According to the section on FTX’s governance, the main red flag identified is the lack of proper financial controls (page number).”
HBP# HK143
5
RUJING MENG
HENRI ARSLANIAN
THE FTX COLLAPSE: DUE DILIGENCE AND
COUNTERPARTY RISK MITIGATION WHEN
INVESTING IN CRYPTO COMPANIES
“Never in my career have I seen such a complete failure of corporate controls
and such a complete absence of trustworthy financial information as occurred
here.” 1
– John Ray, newly appointed CEO for FTX in Bankruptcy
A comment on FTX’s November 2022 collapse
Raffi gazed out the window of the taxi carrying him back to his apartment in Dubai, deep in
thought about the conversation he had just had with his direct supervisor.
As an experienced analyst at a leading Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) in Dubai, Raffi
frequently encountered deals that required his expertise in conducting due diligence.
The SWF Raffi worked for had a reputation for also investing in cutting-edge technology
companies and was open to exploring opportunities that more conservative investors might shy
away from.
It was May 2023, and the crypto industry was still reeling from the collapse of FTX, one of the
most significant financial scandals in recent memory. Numerous crypto companies had gone
under in the aftermath, leaving investors wary of the sector.
Despite the challenges, the SWF’s investment committee (IC) had been presented with several
opportunities to invest in digital asset companies. They recognized the potential of digital assets
as a key driver of future economic growth and were keen on including such companies in their
1 A. Saeedy and S. Biswas, “FTX’s New CEO Faults Lax Oversight in Bankruptcy Filing,” Wall Street Journal, 1
7
November 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftxs-new-chief-says-complete-failure-of-oversight-contributed-to-
firms-downfall-11668696069, accessed 17 March 2023.
Henri Arslanian prepared this case under the supervision of Dr. Rujing Meng for class discussion. This case is not intended to
show effective or ineffective handling of decision or business processes. The authors might have disguised certain information to
protect confidentiality. Cases are written in the past tense, this is not meant to imply that all practices, organizations, people,
places or fact mentioned in the case no longer occur, exist or apply.
© 2023 by The Asia Case Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong. No part of this publication may be digitized, photocopied
or otherwise reproduced, posted or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission of The University of Hong
Kong.
Ref. 23/772C
Last edited: 17 October 202
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftxs-new-chief-says-complete-failure-of-oversight-contributed-to
23/772C The FTX Collapse: Due Diligence and Counterparty Risk Mitigation When Investing in Crypto Companies
portfolio. However, they also understood the importance of identifying and mitigating potential
risks, ranging from investment to reputational, that could arise from these investments.
In light of the FTX collapse and its impact on several prominent institutional investors like
Temasek, Sequoia Capital, and the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (see Exhibit 1), the IC asked
Raffi to analyze the FTX incident and develop recommendations on how to minimize similar
risks going forward, particularly when considering investments in crypto exchanges.
He had to prepare a report that was due for the next IC meeting of the SWF to help them
navigate the risks associated with investing in crypto companies. This was a big assignment,
and one that Raffi knew would be critical as to whether the SWF would consider investing in
such companies.
After a quick dinner, Raffi sat down and started thinking about how to put together this report.
The Crypto Exchange Ecosystem
Any asset class, including crypto-assets, needed a marketplace where they could be bought and
sold. For example, equities were traded on exchanges like the New York Stock Exchange or
London Stock Exchange.
The crypto-asset ecosystem had its equivalent service providers that came in many shapes and
sizes but were broadly separated into two categories: centralised exchanges and decentralised
exchanges.
Centralised Crypto-Asset Exchanges
Centralised exchanges operated in a way not dissimilar to the operations of a stock exchange,
matching buyers and sellers of crypto-assets and acting as middlemen for all trades without
revealing the identity of the buyer or seller. In many cases, they may also serve as the custodian
of the assets.
When looking at centralised crypto exchanges, it’s important to note there were two main types
of centralised exchanges: fiat-to-crypto and crypto-to-crypto. There were also crypto-derivative
exchanges that were generally part of the crypto-to-crypto exchange family.
Fiat-to-Crypto Exchanges
A fiat-to-crypto exchange allowed users to deposit fiat funds in their account (e.g., USD, EUR,
AED) and converted that into the desired crypto asset. For most individuals, a fiat-to-crypto
exchange would be the first on-ramp to the crypto industry.
Operating a fiat-to-crypto exchange was challenging for many years, mainly due to the
difficulties of opening and maintaining a traditional bank account. Until 2020, having a bank
account with a “traditional” bank was very challenging, and only a handful of banks globally
were publicly comfortable dealing with crypto firms. Whilst some were in niche markets (e.g.,
Deltec in the Bahamas or Bank Frick in Liechtenstein), U.S.-based Silvergate and Signature
were the two primary on and off-ramps up until their March 2023 collapse. Following their
collapse in March 2023, opening a bank account became even more difficult for any crypto
company globally.
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23/772C The FTX Collapse: Due Diligence and Counterparty Risk Mitigation When Investing in Crypto Companies
Fiat-to-crypto exchanges played an essential role in the ecosystem, as they were often the first
point of entry for someone entering the crypto space. The dominant fiat-to-crypto exchanges
were also often different from the dominant crypto-to-crypto exchanges.
As of Q1 2023, the crypto exchanges with the most significant market share for fiat-to-crypto
were Coinbase, Kraken, Binance.US and LMAX Digital, quite different from the top five
crypto-to-crypto exchanges, which were Binance, Upbit, OKX, Gate.io and ByBit.2
Crypto-to-Crypto Exchanges
A crypto-to-crypto exchange did not touch currencies and only facilitated the exchange of one
crypto-asset for another. To use the service, a user must send a crypto-asset to the exchange,
like Bitcoin, Ether or a stablecoin (which they may have gotten from a fiat-to-crypto exchange)
and use that crypto-asset to buy other crypto-assets.
As of Q1 2023, the crypto exchanges with the most significant market share for crypto-to-
crypto were Binance, Upbit, OKX, Gate.io and ByBit.3
o Approach to Compliance
Many crypto-to-crypto exchanges traditionally focused less on Know Your Customer (KYC)
and Anti Money Laundering (AML) than fiat-to-crypto exchanges. However, this started
changing in 2018. Initially, many exchanges implemented gradual KYC that only applied when
users tried to redeem funds. For instance, no KYC information was required when you opened
or funded an account, but users had to provide identification if they attempted to withdraw more
than 2 Bitcoin (BTC) a day.
Many exchanges thought this was a good way to comfort regulators whilst not affecting the
user experience during the onboarding process. The thinking was that a user would be keener
to provide information when trying to get their money back rather than at the start when opening
an account.
However, this approach showed a need for more understanding of basic regulations. Whilst any
serious criminal organisation would have a hard time laundering meaningful amounts of money
if it planned to only stay under the 2 BTC limit a day, the reality was that there was often no de
minimis threshold when it came to AML regulations.
In addition, such an exchange may deal with individuals on a sanctioned list or from a
sanctioned country, which was automatically an offense in many jurisdictions. This was why
many crypto-to-crypto exchanges gradually established KYC frameworks.
One of the reasons was clarification from various authorities that such exchanges were not
outside the law, even though they were not touching fiat currencies and only dealt in crypto. A
good example was the accusations from both the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) and the Department of Justice against BitMEX, a significant crypto-to-crypto
derivatives exchange, due in part to the fact that it did not have KYC in place until 2020.4 The
fact that criminal procedures were taken against BitMEX reminded the entire industry that not
2 The Block, “USD Support Exchange Volume,” https://www.theblock.co/data/crypto-markets/spot, accessed 27
March 2023.
3 The Block, “Cryptocurrency Monthly Exchange Volume,” https://www.theblock.co/data/crypto-markets/spot,
accessed 27 March 2023.
4 J.Stempel, “U.S. charges BitMEX cryptocurrency founders with failing to prevent money laundering,” REUTERS,
2 October 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-crime-bitmex-idUSKBN26N08O, accessed 1 January 2023.
3
For the exclusive use of C. Jimenez, 2024.
This document is authorized for use only by Carolina Jimenez in Fall 2024 – Financial Innovations taught by Florent Rouxelin, Florida International University from Aug 2024 to Dec 2024.
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-crime-bitmex-idUSKBN26N08O
https://www.theblock.co/data/crypto-markets/spot
https://www.theblock.co/data/crypto-markets/spot
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taking this seriously could have serious consequences. Numerous similar actions took place
against crypto exchanges including actions from the US CFTC against Binance in March 2023.5
o Crypto Derivative Exchanges
Derivatives also existed in the crypto space. As in the traditional financial services industry,
volumes in crypto derivatives were pretty significant. For example, from December 2020 to
August 2022, the monthly volumes of Bitcoin futures alone had been over $1 trillion a month,
many times the volume of spot Bitcoin.6 Data showed that the ratio between spot Bitcoin and
Bitcoin futures had hovered between 0.2 and 0.77 since January 2020. Whilst there were now
regulated Bitcoin futures offered by players like the CME, the reality was that most Bitcoin and
crypto derivatives take place in crypto-to-crypto exchanges like Binance, OKX, Bybit, BitMEX
and, until November 2022, FTX.
Many crypto derivatives platforms banned clients from markets like the U.S.8 However,
ensuring compliance with these rules could be challenging without investigating the actual
customers of those exchanges, especially since users could easily resort to VPNs to mask their
true location. According to a research report by Inca Digital, where the crypto derivatives
traders resided were far more diverse than what was often divulged by the exchange operators
(see Exhibit 2).
9
Decentralised Crypto-Asset Exchanges
Centralised exchanges had many benefits, including that they were increasingly regulated,
suited for retail investors with customer support and often offered other services like custody,
perfect for beginner traders.
Decentralised crypto exchanges operated differently from their centralised counterparts (see
Exhibit 3). Instead of acting as a middleman, trading occurred directly between buyers and
sellers. Decentralised exchanges saw tremendous growth starting in the summer of 2020 as part
of the overall surge of interest and awareness in decentralised finance (DeFi).
Decentralised exchanges achieved the same goal of letting you buy or trade digital assets but
did so in a different way, as there was no central counterparty. Trades were made peer-to-peer
(P2P) between two users via smart contracts, and each user managed their assets in individual
wallets. These exchanges were typically suited for more advanced traders, as individuals new
to crypto first dipped in a toe using centralised exchanges.
Decentralised exchanges had numerous advantages in terms of lower fees and their
permissionless nature; however, they were also much more complex to use, particularly for the
average retail investor.
Whilst most crypto trading had taken place on centralised exchanges, trading volumes on
decentralised exchanges began to rise rapidly in the summer of 2020. On certain days in August
5 CFTC, “Wilful Evasion of Federal Law and Operating an Illegal Digital Asset Derivatives Exchange,”
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8680-23, accessed 6 April 2023.
6 The Block, “Volume of Bitcoin Futures,”https://www.theblock.co/data/crypto-markets/futures/volume-of-bitcoin-
futures-monthly, accessed 27 March 2023.
7 The Block, “BTC Spot to Futures Volumes (30DMA),” https://www.theblock.co/data/crypto-markets/spot/btc-
spot-to-futures-volume, accessed 10 April 2022.
8 A. Osipovich “U.S. Crypto Traders Evade Exchange Banks,” Wall Street Journal, 30 July 20
21
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-crypto-traders-evade-offshore-exc
hange-bans-11627637401, accessed 1 January 2022.
9 T. Christina, S, Sedlova, E, Dmitriev and A. Zarazinski, “Geotagging Crypto Derivatives Traders With NLP,” Inca
Digital, 2021, accessed 1 April 2023.
4
For the exclusive use of C. Jimenez, 2024.
This document is authorized for use only by Carolina Jimenez in Fall 2024 – Financial Innovations taught by Florent Rouxelin, Florida International University from Aug 2024 to Dec 2024.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-crypto-traders-evade-offshore-exc
https://www.theblock.co/data/crypto-markets/spot/btc
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8680-23
23/772C The FTX Collapse: Due Diligence and Counterparty Risk Mitigation When Investing in Crypto Companies
2020, the daily volume on a decentralised exchange like Uniswap was higher than that of
established centralised exchanges like Coinbase (see Exhibits 4 – 5 on centralised and
decentralised exchange trade volume).
10
Whilst decentralised exchanges still represented less than 15% of the volumes of centralised
exchanges,11 many expected their market share to rise (see Exhibit 6).
The Background of FTX
In 2017, 25-year-old Sam Bankman-Fried (SBF) founded a crypto hedge fund called Alameda
Research.12 He had studied physics and mathematics at MIT and previously worked at the U.S.
hedge fund Jane Street.
In 2019, SBF and Gary Wang launched FTX Trading Ltd., commonly known as FTX (short for
“Futures Exchange”). FTX was branded as an exchange built by traders for traders.13 SBF
served as the CEO of FTX and Wang became the exchange’s Chief Technology Officer.
FTX attracted professional traders and institutional clients with its comprehensive suite of
derivatives offerings, such as futures, options, and leveraged tokens. It also offered both fiat-
to-crypto and crypto-to-crypto offerings, as well as a range of innovative products like
prediction markets and tokenized stocks. Its trading platform was known for its low fees, deep
liquidity, and advanced order types, which set it apart from competitors.14
FTX experienced rapid growth due to high-profile acquisitions, an extensive marketing budget,
and a robust platform.15 Initially based in Hong Kong, SBF relocated the company to the
Bahamas to capitalize on a favourable regulatory environment.1
6
However, FTX’s corporate structure was complex and convoluted. It consisted of more than
100 interconnected companies, subsidiaries, partnerships, and investment vehicles, all under
SBF’s control. The corporate structure spanned multiple legal and tax jurisdictions, with
substantial cash flows moving throughout the network without proper accounting.
17
FTX was also seen as an agile organisation despite its size. SBF was widely regarded as
someone who could make decisions fast. However, this would later be a major flaw. For
example, the liquidators’ investigation later revealed that FTX had a weak corporate governance
structure. Decision-making was highly centralized, with SBF having significant influence over
the company’s operations.1
8
10 J. Young, “DeFi Explosion; Uniswap surpasses Coinbase Pro in daily volume,” Cointelegraph, 31 August 2020,
https://cointelegraph.com/news/defi-explosion-uniswap-surpasses-coi
nbase-pro-in-daily-volume, accessed 1 January 2022.
11 The Block, DEX to CEX Spot Trade Volume (%), “https://www.theblock.co/data/decentralized-finance/dex-non-
custodial/dex-to-cex-spot-trade-volume, accessed 27 March 2023.
12 E. Rosenberg, “Who is Sam Bankman-Fried,” Investopedia, 18 February 2023,
https://www.investopedia.com/who-is-sam-bankman-fried-6830274, accessed 1 April 2023.
13 T. Smith, “FTX: An Overview of the Exchange and Its Collapse,” Investopedia, 5 January 2023,
https://www.investopedia.com/ftx-exchange-5200842, accessed 10 April 2023.
14 T. Smith, “FTX: An Overview of the Exchange and Its Collapse,” Investopedia, 5 January 2023,
https://www.investopedia.com/ftx-exchange-5200842, accessed 10 April 2023.
15 “Ibid.”
16 F. Chaparro and A. Keely, “FTX will begin to move key operations to Bahamas as part of HQ shift,” The Block,
24 September 2021, https://www.theblock.co/linked/118663/ftx-will-begin-to-move-key-operations-to-bahamas-
as-part-of-hq-shift, accessed 10 April 2023.
17 B. Elder, “Untangling the knotty empire of Bankman-Fried and FTX,” Financial Times, 10 November 2022,
https://www.ft.com/content/c28e0570-d4c4-433c-b0a0-c99fba613822, accessed 26 April 2023.
18 Kroll Restructuring Administration Cases, “NOTICE OF FILING FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF
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This document is authorized for use only by Carolina Jimenez in Fall 2024 – Financial Innovations taught by Florent Rouxelin, Florida International University from Aug 2024 to Dec 2024.
https://www.ft.com/content/c28e0570-d4c4-433c-b0a0-c99fba613822
https://www.theblock.co/linked/118663/ftx-will-begin-to-move-key-operations-to-bahamas
https://www.investopedia.com/ftx-exchange-5200842
https://www.investopedia.com/ftx-exchange-5200842
https://www.investopedia.com/who-is-sam-bankman-fried-6830274
https://www.theblock.co/data/decentralized-finance/dex-non
https://cointelegraph.com/news/defi-explosion-uniswap-surpasses-coi
23/772C The FTX Collapse: Due Diligence and Counterparty Risk Mitigation When Investing in Crypto Companies
Many would raise questions about the potential links between FTX and Alameda. But SBF
would publicly mention numerous times how the two entities were completely separate and had
no interaction. The reality, as it would unfold, was very different, with a back door being created
that ensured that Alameda had a limitless ability to trade and withdraw from the exchange
regardless of the size of its account balance and an exemption of Alameda from the auto-
liquidation process that applied to other customers.
While FTX claimed to prioritize strict governance processes and procedures, its actual practices
would later come under scrutiny. It would turn out the company had very poor processes and
procedures when it came to governance and client asset segregation, with employees sometimes
joking how they would lose track of millions of dollars.
19
SBF also presented himself as the role model of legal and regulatory compliance. However, it
would turn out that the reality in practice was way different. FTX faced multiple compliance
issues, with inadequate adherence to local and international regulations, especially when it
came to the segregation of client assets.
20
Financially, FTX appeared to be in good shape. By the end of 2021, the company was valued
at $32 billion.21 However, this valuation masked underlying issues with its financial records,
accounting practices, and the extent of its liabilities. Additionally, early warning signs pointed
to potential problems, such as the company’s opaque corporate structure and SBF’s tendency to
push the boundaries of regulation.
SBF became a prominent figure in the crypto world, presenting himself as the face of the
institutional, mature and regulated crypto industry and was able to attract a list of influential
investors by the end of 2021 (see Exhibit 7).
22
His attitude and presentation were very atypical. He would often be seen only wearing an FTX
t-shirt and shorts and even went on stage at important events in such attire (see Exhibit 8).
FTX also led the charge in mainstream marketing during the 2021 crypto bull run, signing an
impressive roster of celebrity ambassadors and securing high-profile partnerships with sports
and entertainment organizations.23
FTX would be the sponsor of the NBA’s Miami Heat and Golden State Warriors, the University
of California at Berkeley’s football stadium, the Formula One racing team Mercedes-AMG
Petronas, Major League Baseball umpires and a number of esports teams worldwide. The
JOHN J. RAY III TO THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ON
CONTROL FAILURES AT THE FTX EXCHANGES,” https://restructuring.ra.kroll.com/FTX/, accessed 8 May 2023.
19 V. Cavaliere, “FTX Failure Rooted in ‘Hubris,’ ‘Greed,’ Debtors Report Says,” Bloomberg, 9 April 2023,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-09/ftx-failure-rooted-in-hubris-and-greed-debtors-report-finds, accessed
26 April 2023.
20 Kroll Restructuring Administration Cases, “NOTICE OF FILING FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF
JOHN J. RAY III TO THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ON
CONTROL FAILURES AT THE FTX EXCHANGES,” https://restructuring.ra.kroll.com/FTX/, accessed 8 May 2023.
21 R. Browne, Cryptocurrency exchange FTX hits $32 billion valuation despite bear market fears,” CNBC, 31 January 2022,
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/31/crypto-exchange-ftx-valued-at-32-billion-amid-bitcoin-price-plunge.html, accessed 26
April 2023.
22 C. Weinberg, Inside the Venture FOMO Machine That Powered SBF’s Meteoric Rise,” The Information, 11 November 2022,
https://www.theinformation.com/articles/inside-the-venture-fomo-machine-that-powered-sbfs-meteoric-rise?rc=xrnyxn,
accessed 10 April 2023.
23 Wall Street Journal, “Tom Brady. Stephen Curry. Shaq. See the Celebrities With Ties to FTX,” 10 November 2022,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-celebrities-including-tom-brady-tied-to-ftx-see-the-list-11668109684, accessed 10 April
2023.
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For the exclusive use of C. Jimenez, 2024.
This document is authorized for use only by Carolina Jimenez in Fall 2024 – Financial Innovations taught by Florent Rouxelin, Florida International University from Aug 2024 to Dec 2024.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-celebrities-including-tom-brady-tied-to-ftx-see-the-list-11668109684
https://www.theinformation.com/articles/inside-the-venture-fomo-machine-that-powered-sbfs-meteoric-rise?rc=xrnyxn
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/31/crypto-exchange-ftx-valued-at-32-billion-amid-bitcoin-price-plunge.html
https://restructuring.ra.kroll.com/FTX
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-09/ftx-failure-rooted-in-hubris-and-greed-debtors-report-finds
https://restructuring.ra.kroll.com/FTX
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exchange also signed a number of athletes as brand ambassadors, including Tom Brady, Steph
Curry, Naomi Osaka and Shohei Ohtani.24
As FTX’s presence expanded, SBF became a regular fixture in Washington, D.C., working with
policymakers to develop a comprehensive regulatory framework for the crypto ecosystem.25
FTX was seen as not only a leading crypto exchange but also as probably the most transparent
crypto exchange globally. And investors liked that, with the company being valued as high as
$32 billion26 in January 2021. In May 2022, FTX surpassed Coinbase as the second-largest
centralized crypto exchange.27
SBF also emerged as one of the most significant political donors within the crypto industry and
beyond, contributing tens of millions of dollars to various campaigns.28
As several crypto firms began to unravel in the summer of 2022, starting with Terra’s
implosion,29 SBF embarked on a rescue mission. He acquired struggling crypto lender BlockFi
for $240 million, bid for bankrupt exchange Voyager’s assets, and considered purchasing
Celsius’s remaining assets.
SBF’s actions drew comparisons to John Pierpont Morgan, who used his financial prowess to
save America’s banking system in the early 20th century (see Exhibit 9).
SBF also published his views on how to regulate crypto companies in October 2022, only weeks
before the collapse of FTX.30 In a blog published on the FTX US website, SBF outlined a path
forward for crypto self-regulation, covering different areas like more disclosures around crypto
advertising, regular audits for fiat-backed stablecoins and a checklist to determine whether a
token qualifies as a security.31
The FTX Collapse
The Key Events Leading Up to The FTX Bankruptcy
July 2021: Binance, an early investor in FTX, sold its stake in the firm for $2.1 billion,
with a portion of that amount being paid in FTX’s native exchange token – FTT. At the
time, Binance’s decision to sell its stake in FTX was covered in the media as a parting of
24 “Ibid.”
25 L. Fang, K. Klippenstein and D. Boguslaw, “NEW FTX FILING PULLS BACK THE CURTAIN ON SAM BANKMAN-
FRIED’S MASSIVE INFLUENCE-PEDDLING OPERATION, The Intercept, 30 January 2023,
https://theintercept.com/2023/01/30/ftx-sam-bankman-fried-lobbying-pr/, accessed 10 April 2023.
26 R. Brown, “Cryptocurrency exchange FTX hits $32 billion valuation despite bear market fears,” CNBC, 31 January 2022,
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/31/crypto-exchange-ftx-valued-at-32-billion-amid-bitcoin-price-plunge.html, accessed 27
March 2023.
27 C. Moura, “FTX surpassed Coinbase as second-biggest centralized crypto exchange in May” The Block, 1 June
2022, https://www.theblock.co/linked/149654/ftx-surpassed-coinbase-as-second-biggest-centralized-crypto-
exchange-in-may, accessed 10 April 2022.
28 L. Fang, K. Klippenstein and D. Boguslaw, “NEW FTX FILING PULLS BACK THE CURTAIN ON SAM BANKMAN-
FRIED’S MASSIVE INFLUENCE-PEDDLING OPERATION, The Intercept, 30 January 2023,
https://theintercept.com/2023/01/30/ftx-sam-bankman-fried-lobbying-pr/, accessed 10 April 2023.
29 C. Ostroff and A. Osipovich, “Crash of TerraUSD Shakes Crypto. ‘There Was a Run on the Bank.’,” Wall Street Journal,
12
May 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/crash-of-terrausd-shakes-crypto-there-was-a-run-on-the-bank-11652371839, accessed
10 April 2023.
30FTX US, “Possible Digital Asset Industry Standards,” 19 October 2022,
https://www.ftxpolicy.com/posts/possible-digital-asset-industry-standards, accessed 6 April 2023.
31 S. Haig, “SBF Replies to ‘Constructive Feedback’ on His Regulatory Proposals,” The Defiant, 24 October 2022,
https://thedefiant.io/sbf-replies-critics-regulation, accessed 10 April 2023.
7
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This document is authorized for use only by Carolina Jimenez in Fall 2024 – Financial Innovations taught by Florent Rouxelin, Florida International University from Aug 2024 to Dec 2024.
https://thedefiant.io/sbf-replies-critics-regulation
https://www.ftxpolicy.com/posts/possible-digital-asset-industry-standards
https://www.wsj.com/articles/crash-of-terrausd-shakes-crypto-there-was-a-run-on-the-bank-11652371839
New FTX Filing Pulls Back the Curtain on Sam Bankman-Fried’s Massive Influence-Peddling Operation
https://www.theblock.co/linked/149654/ftx-surpassed-coinbase-as-second-biggest-centralized-crypto
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/31/crypto-exchange-ftx-valued-at-32-billion-amid-bitcoin-price-plunge.html
New FTX Filing Pulls Back the Curtain on Sam Bankman-Fried’s Massive Influence-Peddling Operation
23/772C The FTX Collapse: Due Diligence and Counterparty Risk Mitigation When Investing in Crypto Companies
ways between SBF and Binance CEO Changpeng ‘CZ’ Zhao, who had drifted apart over
competing stances on how the crypto ecosystem should be overseen and regulated.
May 9, 2022: TerraUSD (USDT) collapsed, wiping out over $50 billion in investor
value. Alameda Research suffered significant losses, which would later be revealed
to have been covered by FTX client funds.
June 12, 2022: Pointing to extreme market conditions, crypto lender Celsius informed
users that it was suspending all account withdrawals.
June 27, 2022: Crypto hedge fund Three Arrows Capital, which had invested heavily in
USDT, defaulted on billions of dollars of loan payments to lenders Voyager, Genesis and
BlockFi.
July 5, 2022: Voyager filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Timeline of FTX’s November 2022 Collapse
FTX collapsed in about one week in November 2022.
November 2, 2022: Crypto media outlet CoinDesk published an article about conflicts of
interest between FTX and Alameda Research32. The article revealed that Alameda
Research’s primary asset was FTX’s native token – FTT. This sparked widespread concern
in the crypto ecosystem, as Alameda’s primary asset and collateral was an illiquid token
created by the exchange. If FTX’s and Alameda’s assets were segregated, there should be
in theory no risk for investors.
November 6, 2022: Binance sold FTT holdings. Pointing to the revelations from the
CoinDesk report, Binance CEO CZ announced on Twitter that Binance liquidated the $530
million of FTT it had received in July 2021 for selling its early stake in FTX (see Exhibit
10).
This caused the price of FTT to plummet and thus a crisis of confidence in FTX. Even
though SBF continued to claim on Twitter that all customers would be made whole and
that FTX had the funds to withstand the flood of withdrawal requests (see Exhibit 11), the
investors rushed to withdraw funds they had on the FTX platform. FT struggled to handle
customer redemptions, which soared to $6bn within 72 hours of CZ’s tweet.
If FTX held client assets and had not used them to patch a gap with their sister company
Alameda, then even large redemption amounts should not cause an issue. However, FTX
was using client deposits for Alameda.
Shortly after, the inevitable happened and FTX paused all customer withdrawals. Whilst
FTX claimed at the time that they were experiencing a liquidity crunch, it became clear
within days that FTX was not illiquid but potentially insolvent.
November 8, 2022: Binance shocked the global crypto ecosystem when it announced that
it had reached a non-binding agreement to purchase FTX (see Exhibit 12).
32 CoinDesk, “Divisions in Sam Bankman-Fried’s Crypto Empire Blur on His Trading Titan Alameda’s Balance
Sheet,” 2 November 2022, https://www.coindesk.com/business/2022/11/02/divisions-in-sam-bankman-frieds-
crypto-empire-blur-on-his-trading-titan-alamedas-balance-sheet/, accessed 10 April 2023.
8
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https://www.coindesk.com/business/2022/11/02/divisions-in-sam-bankman-frieds
23/772C The FTX Collapse: Due Diligence and Counterparty Risk Mitigation When Investing in Crypto Companies
November 9, 2022: After performing due diligence on the tentative sale, the deal fell
through, with Binance citing reports of misappropriation of funds and potential U.S.
investigations33.
November 10, 2022: A Wall Street Journal report34 revealed that FTX had lent billions of
dollars in customer deposits to fund risky bets by Alameda Research, contradicting earlier
denials by SBF and FTX.
November 11, 2022: SBF stepped down as the FTX CEO. FTX and all its subsidiaries filed
for bankruptcy and liquidators were appointed with John Ray succeeding SBF as the CEO
for FTX in Bankruptcy 35. John Ray led the liquidation of disgraced energy titan Enron in
2000s.
Post-FTX Fallout
November 14, 2022: After FTX (a critical lifeline for the crypto lending industry during
the summer of 2022) imploded, BlockFi paused customer withdrawals, citing significant
exposure to the exchange.
November 28, 2022: BlockFi followed FTX into bankruptcy. The lender listed 100,000
creditors and liabilities ranging from $1 billion to $10 billion.
December 12, 2022: SBF was arrested in the Bahamas after federal prosecutors in New
York filed criminal charges. A week later, SBF agreed to be transferred into US custody.
December 22, 2022: SBF was released on a $250 million bond, the largest in history, and
placed under house arrest at his parents’ California home.
January 19, 2023: Crypto lender Genesis filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
March 8, 2023: Silvergate Capital, one of the most important banks in the crypto
ecosystem, announced that it was winding down operations and that its remaining assets
would be liquidated. Two days, fellow crypto-friendly bank Signature was seized by
regulators after a run on deposits.
Findings From FTX Debtors Report
In April 2023, FTX Trading Ltd. under the leadership of CEO John Ray III along with FTX’s
affiliated debtors released a report that identified critical control failures by FTX’s previous
management team under SBF.36
33 P. Kowsmann, “Binance Walks Away From Deal to Rescue FTX,” Wall Street Journal, 10 November 2022,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/binance-is-said-to-be-likely-to-walk-away-from-deal-to-buy-ftx-11668020963,
accessed 27 March 2023.
34 V. Ge Huang, A. Osipovich and P. Kowsmann, “FTX Tapped Into Customer Accounts to Fund Risky Bets,
Setting Up Its Downfall,” Wall Street Journal, 11 November 2022,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftx-tapped-into-customer-accounts-to-fund-risky-bets-setting-up-its-downfall-
11668093732, accessed 27 March 2023.
Kroll Restructuring Administration Cases, “FTX Trading Ltd. Case No. 22-11068,”
https://restructuring.ra.kroll.com/FTX/, accessed 27 March 2023.
36 Kroll Restructuring Administration Cases, “NOTICE OF FILING FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF
JOHN J. RAY III TO THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ON
CONTROL FAILURES AT THE FTX EXCHANGES,” https://restructuring.ra.kroll.com/FTX/, accessed 8 May 2023.
9
35
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This document is authorized for use only by Carolina Jimenez in Fall 2024 – Financial Innovations taught by Florent Rouxelin, Florida International University from Aug 2024 to Dec 2024.
https://restructuring.ra.kroll.com/FTX
https://restructuring.ra.kroll.com/FTX
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftx-tapped-into-customer-accounts-to-fund-risky-bets-setting-up-its-downfall
https://www.wsj.com/articles/binance-is-said-to-be-likely-to-walk-away-from-deal-to-buy-ftx-11668020963
23/772C The FTX Collapse: Due Diligence and Counterparty Risk Mitigation When Investing in Crypto Companies
The report found numerous shortcomings in the company’s governance, legal and compliance,
AML, cybersecurity, financial management, solvency, and operational risk management.
For example, the report highlighted that FTX had invested in robust cybersecurity measures;
however, the rapid growth of the company and the increasing complexity of its operations
outpaced the development of its security infrastructure. This left FTX vulnerable to potential
cyber threats.
The investigation also uncovered various operational risks within FTX, including over-reliance
on key personnel, inadequate risk management processes, and a lack of business continuity
planning. These shortcomings made FTX more susceptible to external shocks and contributed
to the company’s collapse.
FTX’s financial management practices raised concerns as well, as the company had not
maintained a clear separation of assets between FTX and its sister company, Alameda Research.
The investigation also revealed that FTX had engaged in risky lending activities, using
customer deposits to fund Alameda Research’s speculative bets.
Next Steps
After Raffi spent a couple of hours reading about the FTX collapse, he started reflecting on the
key areas of focus that any investor looking at a crypto exchange should focus on in order to
have a framework that could be used when conducting due diligence on such companies. What
were the key areas of focus that should have been looked at? Raffi stared at the blank screen
and started putting his thoughts into a document.
10
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23/772C The FTX Collapse: Due Diligence and Counterparty Risk Mitigation When Investing in Crypto Companies
EXHIBIT 1: A NOTE FROM SEQUOIA CAPITAL TO LIMITED PARTNERS MARKING FTX
STAKE DOWN TO $0
Source: Sequoia Capital, https://www.sequoiacap.com/, accessed 1 April 2023.
11
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This document is authorized for use only by Carolina Jimenez in Fall 2024 – Financial Innovations taught by Florent Rouxelin, Florida International University from Aug 2024 to Dec 2024.
23/772C The FTX Collapse: Due Diligence and Counterparty Risk Mitigation When Investing in Crypto Companies
EXHIBIT 2: SHARE OF CRYPTO DERIVATIVES TRADING BY COUNTRY
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
50000
Source: T. Christina, S, Sedlova, E, Dmitriev and A. Zarazinski, “Geotagging Crypto Derivatives
Traders With NLP,” Inca Digital, 2021, accessed 1 April 2023.
12
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This document is authorized for use only by Carolina Jimenez in Fall 2024 – Financial Innovations taught by Florent Rouxelin, Florida International University from Aug 2024 to Dec 2024.
23/772C The FTX Collapse: Due Diligence and Counterparty Risk Mitigation When Investing in Crypto Companies
EXHIBIT 3: COMPARISON OF DECENTRALISED EXCHANGES WITH CENTRALISED
EXCHANGES
The key differences between centralised and decentralised exchanges broken down by levels
of regulatory compliance, user accessibility, liquidity, and fee structures.
Source: H. Arslanian, The Book of Crypto: The Complete Guide to Understanding Bitcoin,
Cryptocurrencies and Digital Assets (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), pp. 338.
13
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This document is authorized for use only by Carolina Jimenez in Fall 2024 – Financial Innovations taught by Florent Rouxelin, Florida International University from Aug 2024 to Dec 2024.
23
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14
For the exclusive use of C. Jimenez, 2024.
This document is authorized for use only by Carolina Jimenez in Fall 2024 – Financial Innovations taught by Florent Rouxelin, Florida International University from Aug 2024 to Dec 2024.
https://www.theblock.co/data/crypto-markets/spot/cryptocurrency-exchange-volume-monthly
23
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15
For the exclusive use of C. Jimenez, 2024.
This document is authorized for use only by Carolina Jimenez in Fall 2024 – Financial Innovations taught by Florent Rouxelin, Florida International University from Aug 2024 to Dec 2024.
https://www.theblock.co/data/decentralized-finance/dex-non-custodial/dex-volume-monthly
23/772C The FTX Collapse: Due Diligence and Counterparty Risk Mitigation When Investing in Crypto Companies
EXHIBIT 6: RATIO OF DECENTRALISED TO CENTRALISED CRYPTO EXCHANGE
TRADE VOLUME
Source: The Block, DEX to CEX Spot Trade Volume (%),
https://www.theblock.co/data/decentralized-finance/dex-non-custodial/dex-to-cex-spot-trade-
volume, accessed 27 March 2023.
16
For the exclusive use of C. Jimenez, 2024.
This document is authorized for use only by Carolina Jimenez in Fall 2024 – Financial Innovations taught by Florent Rouxelin, Florida International University from Aug 2024 to Dec 2024.
https://www.theblock.co/data/decentralized-finance/dex-non-custodial/dex-to-cex-spot-trade
23/772C The FTX Collapse: Due Diligence and Counterparty Risk Mitigation When Investing in Crypto Companies
EXHIBIT 7: THE SBF MACHINE
FTX and SBF had a massive reach. Here is a chart of the major firms that invested in FTX,
firms with funds held by FTX, significant FTX investments, celebrities who invested in FTX,
companies SBF invested in and startups that Alameda Research led investments into.
Source: C. Weinberg, Inside the Venture FOMO Machine That Powered SBF’s Meteoric Rise,”
The Information, 11 November 2022, https://www.theinformation.com/articles/inside-the-
venture-fomo-machine-that-powered-sbfs-meteoric-rise?rc=xrnyxn, accessed 10 April 2023.
17
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This document is authorized for use only by Carolina Jimenez in Fall 2024 – Financial Innovations taught by Florent Rouxelin, Florida International University from Aug 2024 to Dec 2024.
https://www.theinformation.com/articles/inside-the
23/772C The FTX Collapse: Due Diligence and Counterparty Risk Mitigation When Investing in Crypto Companies
EXHIBIT 8: AN EXAMPLE OF SBF’S LEVEL OF INFLUENCE
Source: Dan Keeler [@dankeeler] 28 April 2022, Tony Blair and Bill Clinton on stage with SBF
[Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/dankeeler/status/1519780887893790724?lang=en.
18
For the exclusive use of C. Jimenez, 2024.
This document is authorized for use only by Carolina Jimenez in Fall 2024 – Financial Innovations taught by Florent Rouxelin, Florida International University from Aug 2024 to Dec 2024.
Tony Blair and Bill Clinton on the same stage (and SBF.) You don’t see that very often these days, eh? pic.twitter.com/Vt5pn6egHn
— Dan Keeler (@dankeeler) April 28, 2022
23/772C The FTX Collapse: Due Diligence and Counterparty Risk Mitigation When Investing in Crypto Companies
EXHIBIT 9: “THE NEW JOHN PIERPONT MORGAN”
Comments equating SBF to John Pierpont Morgan became frequent by the summer of 2022.
Source: Skybridge Capital [@skybridge] 21 June 2022, SBF is the new JP Morgan [Tweet].
Retrieved from https://twitter.com/SkyBridge/status/1539337803083005957.
19
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This document is authorized for use only by Carolina Jimenez in Fall 2024 – Financial Innovations taught by Florent Rouxelin, Florida International University from Aug 2024 to Dec 2024.
“Sam Bankman-Fried (@SBF_FTX) is the new John Pierpont Morgan — he is bailing out cryptocurrency markets the way the original J.P. Morgan did after the crisis of 1907” – @Scaramucci https://t.co/CiDg5rbvEN
— SkyBridge (@SkyBridge) June 21, 2022
23/772C The FTX Collapse: Due Diligence and Counterparty Risk Mitigation When Investing in Crypto Companies
EXHIBIT 10: THE TWEET BY BINANCE CEO CZ TO LIQUIDATE FTT
FTX’s early November implosion occurred almost entirely on Twitter. Events accelerated when
Binance CEO CZ announced the exchange would reduce its exposure to FTX Token (FTT).
Source: CZ [@cz_binance] 6 November 2022, Binance to liquidate FTT [Tweet]. Retrieved from
Liquidating our FTT is just post-exit risk management, learning from LUNA. We gave support before, but we won't pretend to make love after divorce. We are not against anyone. But we won't support people who lobby against other industry players behind their backs. Onwards.
— CZ 🔶 BNB (@cz_binance) November 6, 2022
20
For the exclusive use of C. Jimenez, 2024.
This document is authorized for use only by Carolina Jimenez in Fall 2024 – Financial Innovations taught by Florent Rouxelin, Florida International University from Aug 2024 to Dec 2024.
Liquidating our FTT is just post-exit risk management, learning from LUNA. We gave support before, but we won't pretend to make love after divorce. We are not against anyone. But we won't support people who lobby against other industry players behind their backs. Onwards.
— CZ 🔶 BNB (@cz_binance) November 6, 2022
23/772C The FTX Collapse: Due Diligence and Counterparty Risk Mitigation When Investing in Crypto Companies
EXHIBIT 11: THE TWEET BY SBF ASSURING FTX USERS
A screenshot of a now infamous tweet by SBF assuring FTX users that their funds were safe
and that the exchange was experiencing a small liquidity problem.
Source: C. Hetzner, “Sam Bankman-Fried quietly deletes his claim that FTX customer funds are
safe,” Fortune, 9 November 2022, https://fortune.com/2022/11/09/ftx-binance-sam-bankman-
fried-customer-funds-deposits-safe/, accessed 10 April 2023.
21
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This document is authorized for use only by Carolina Jimenez in Fall 2024 – Financial Innovations taught by Florent Rouxelin, Florida International University from Aug 2024 to Dec 2024.
https://fortune.com/2022/11/09/ftx-binance-sam-bankman
23/772C The FTX Collapse: Due Diligence and Counterparty Risk Mitigation When Investing in Crypto Companies
EXHIBIT 12: THE TWEET BY CZ ANNOUNCING BINANCE’S INTENT TO ACQUIRE FTX
A surprise announcement from Binance CEO CZ temporarily calmed crypto markets. Within
24 hours, the deal would be dead.
Source: CZ [@cz_binance] 8 November 2022, Binance to acquire FTX [Tweet]. Retrieved from
https://twitter.com/cz_binance/status/1590013613586411520.
22
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This document is authorized for use only by Carolina Jimenez in Fall 2024 – Financial Innovations taught by Florent Rouxelin, Florida International University from Aug 2024 to Dec 2024.
This afternoon, FTX asked for our help. There is a significant liquidity crunch. To protect users, we signed a non-binding LOI, intending to fully acquire https://t.co/BGtFlCmLXB and help cover the liquidity crunch. We will be conducting a full DD in the coming days.
— CZ 🔶 BNB (@cz_binance) November 8, 2022
- THE FTX COLLAPSE: DUE DILIGENCE AND COUNTERPARTY RISK MITIGATION WHEN INVESTING IN CRYPTO COMPANIES
The Crypto Exchange Ecosystem
Centralised Crypto-Asset Exchanges
Decentralised Crypto-Asset Exchanges
The Background of FTX
The FTX Collapse
The Key Events Leading Up to The FTX Bankruptcy
Timeline of FTX’s November 2022 Collapse
Post-FTX Fallout
Findings From FTX Debtors Report
Next Steps
EXHIBIT 1: A NOTE FROM SEQUOIA CAPITAL TO LIMITED PARTNERS MARKING FTX STAKE DOWN TO $0
EXHIBIT 2: SHARE OF CRYPTO DERIVATIVES TRADING BY COUNTRY
EXHIBIT 3: COMPARISON OF DECENTRALISED EXCHANGES WITH CENTRALISED EXCHANGES
EXHIBIT 4: TRADE VOLUME OF MAJOR CENTRALISED CRYPTO EXCHANGES BY MONTH
EXHIBIT 5: TRADE VOLUME OF MAJOR DECENTRALISED CRYPTO EXCHANGES BY MONTH
EXHIBIT 6: RATIO OF DECENTRALISED TO CENTRALISED CRYPTO EXCHANGE TRADE VOLUME
EXHIBIT 7: THE SBF MACHINE
EXHIBIT 8: AN EXAMPLE OF SBF’S LEVEL OF INFLUENCE
EXHIBIT 9: “THE NEW JOHN PIERPONT MORGAN”
EXHIBIT 10: THE TWEET BY BINANCE CEO CZ TO LIQUIDATE FTT
EXHIBIT 11: THE TWEET BY SBF ASSURING FTX USERS
EXHIBIT 12: THE TWEET BY CZ ANNOUNCING BINANCE’S INTENT TO ACQUIRE FTX
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