Posted: April 24th, 2025
Social Science Research: Topic Selection/Annotated Bibliography Assignment
OVERVIEW
Throughout the course you will work on a formal research that will be submitted in three
stages. The topic should be based on academic research in the economic and
financial management of sport from a chapter in one of the resources provided below (several chapters attached from Andreff, W., & Szymanski, S. (Eds.). (2006). Handbook on the economics of sport.
Edward Elgar Publishing)
SMGT 506
Research Paper: Topic Selection/Annotated Bibliography Assignment
Instructions
Overview
Throughout the course you will work on a formal research paper that will be submitted in three stages. The topic of the paper should be based on academic research in the economic and financial management of sport from a chapter in one of the resources provided below.
Before writing your
Research Paper: Final Draft Assignment, you are required to identify a topic, in addition to your topic chapter, research at least three peer-reviewed, scholarly sources published in the last five years and create an annotated bibliography.
Your topic should be based on a chapter from one of the following electronic resources available from the Jerry Falwell Library website:
· Andreff, W., & Szymanski, S. (Eds.). (2006).
Handbook on the economics of sport. Edward Elgar Publishing.
· Breuer, M., & Forrest, D. (Eds.). (2018).
The Palgrave handbook on the economics of manipulation in sport. Palgrave McMillan.
· Dodds, M., Heisey, K., & Ahonen, A. (Eds.). (2017).
Routledge handbook of international sport business. Routledge. (*Chapters from parts I, III, VI, and VII only)
· Maennig, W., & Zimbalist, A. (Eds.). (2012).
International handbook on the economics of mega sporting events. Edward Elgar.
· Schmidt, S. (Ed.). (2021).
21st Century sports: How technologies will change sports in the digital age. Springer.
Instructions
Include the following elements in your
Research Paper: Topic Selection/Annotated Bibliography Assignment:
· Write a brief paragraph describing your research topic.
· For your Annotated Bibliography:
· Research at least 3 peer-reviewed sources that will serve as the foundation of your
Research Paper: Final Draft Assignment.
· Provide a full reference for each source using the most current edition of APA formatting.
· Summarize the main idea of each source in four to six sentences. Include the purpose of the article, key findings, and any information related to the sampling and methodology.
· Relate the material found in each source to your research topic using an additional one to two sentences.
· Evaluate the background of the author(s) and the intended audience.
· The sources at this stage should be high quality, relevant articles from peer-reviewed academic journals or chapters from relevant edited textbooks.
Be sure to review the
Research Paper: Topic Selection/Annotated Bibliography Grading Rubric before beginning this
Research Paper: Topic Selection/Annotated Bibliography
Assignment.
4 Sport and gambling
David Forrest
The economics of sport and the economics of gambling are distinct subdisciplines; but
they overlap because the activities they analyse are so often bound up with each other.
Indeed it may fairly be said that some professional sports would not be viable at all but
for the betting markets that underpin them. Horse racing in many jurisdictions, and jai
alai in certain states of America, are examples of sports where the bulk of revenue has
always been extracted from the wagering markets that run alongside them. Thus, in early
twentieth-century America, horse racing had to shut down altogether in states that
enacted a prohibition on bookmaking at the track (Munting, 1996) while jai alai today is
played only in a few states and only where betting is legal and the principal reason for
attendance at the event (Skiena, 2001).
Of course, most sports are not as dependent on betting as these examples. Nevertheless,
the existence of high-volume betting markets on sports such as American football, soccer
and cricket matters, or should matter, to sports economists. In this review, three broad
reasons for sports economists to think seriously about betting on sport are considered.
First, sports leagues and promoters generate a positive externality for bookmakers by
providing extra and popular vehicles for betting. Given ownership of copyright over
fixtures, sports may be able to charge for the provision of this externality, much as they
extract payment from broadcasters when they provide them with opportunities for extra
and popular television programmes. Many of the same issues arise as in the case of broad-
casting, for example, the betting sector may be willing to pay more to a sports league if
changes in game design are made to accommodate its interests.
Second, while benefiting sports by stimulating interest and providing an additional
source of revenue, gambling may pose a threat by introducing incentives for corruption.
Match fixing associated with betting is a threat from a commercial, as well as a moral,
perspective because stadium and television demand will fall if events on the field lose
credibility and sponsorship income will be threatened if firms fear being tainted by asso-
ciation with cheating. Economic analysis can offer insights on how incentives to cheat for
betting gain can be minimised and it can be used to illuminate public policy issues such
as whether corruption will be more severe if sports betting takes place as a legal or illegal
activity.
A third reason for thinking about gambling is that the existence of wagering markets
can potentially serve the interests not only of sports but also the work of sports econo-
mists. If odds can be assumed ‘efficient’ in the sense of providing unbiased probabilistic
forecasts of sporting outcomes, they can be exploited, for example, for constructing
ex ante measures of match-level outcome uncertainty. Studies of movements in odds
could be similarly informative, for example by generating market-based assessments of
the importance to a team of particular star players who become unavailable for particu-
lar games.
40
C
o
p
y
r
i
g
h
t
2
0
0
6
.
E
d
w
a
r
d
E
l
g
a
r
P
u
b
l
i
s
h
i
n
g
.
A
l
l
r
i
g
h
t
s
r
e
s
e
r
v
e
d
.
M
a
y
n
o
t
b
e
r
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
i
n
a
n
y
f
o
r
m
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
p
e
r
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
p
u
b
l
i
s
h
e
r
,
e
x
c
e
p
t
f
a
i
r
u
s
e
s
p
e
r
m
i
t
t
e
d
u
n
d
e
r
U
.
S
.
o
r
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
b
l
e
c
o
p
y
r
i
g
h
t
l
a
w
.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 10/29/2024 9:08 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY
AN: 182123 ; Wladimir Andreff, Stefan Szymanski.; Handbook on the Economics of Sport
Account: liberty.main.ehost
Potential Benefits to Sport from Gambling
Gambling on sports events has, of course, a history going back centuries, indeed millen-
nia. For example, Sauer (1998) quotes a contemporary description of crowds en route to
the Circus Maximus in Ancient Rome as ‘already in a fury of anxiety about their bets’;
and historians such as Munting (1996) document a close association between gambling
and sports such as cricket and baseball in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain and
America. But for much of the twentieth century, demand for betting, and gambling gen-
erally, was suppressed in many countries by prohibition. Until recently, for instance,
betting on team sports was not possible legally in Hong Kong or in any American state
other than Nevada, though horse racing flourished in many areas thanks to the tolerance
of on-track betting.
The world, however, now appears to be in a phase of secularly increasing legal toler-
ation of all manner of gaming activities. In America, the first state lottery game did not
appear until 1964 and only Nevada permitted casinos prior to 1976. But the ‘lotto mania’
of the 1980s and 1990s, and the growth of Indian and riverboat casinos in the 1990s, gave
a large majority of Americans access to these gambling media by the turn of the century.
This liberalisation was bad news for those sports – horse and dog racing and jai alai – that
had enjoyed protection because their product was bundled with the only legal betting
opportunities available to the public. Thoroughbred racing declined in most states. Jai alai
folded altogether in Connecticut after the opening of the world’s biggest casino. Recovery
was achieved only where racetracks were permitted to turn themselves into ‘racinos’, with
casino-style gaming machines to complement the sports offer. The same policy saved jai
alai in Rhode Island. The spread of lotteries and casinos to many jurisdictions around the
world had similar consequences for horse racing, and sometimes the same policy
response, as in the United States.
Sports betting (a term commonly defined to exclude horse and dog wagering) has, on
the other hand, flourished in most of the world in the new liberal environment for gam-
bling, further boosted by new opportunities to place internet bets with offshore book-
makers. Several jurisdictions (such as Singapore and Hong Kong) have introduced soccer
wagering to curb the flow of bettors’ funds to offshore centres (or to the illegal sector). In
the United States, however, internet betting remains illegal and active attempts are made
to enforce the prohibition by barring credit card companies from settling payments to
betting operators in countries, such as Costa Rica, that serve the American market. That
the offshore sector remains intact – indeed Costa Rica had the highest sports betting
turnover of any jurisdiction in the world in 2003 (Global Betting and Gaming
Consultants, 2005) – is testimony both to the difficulty of controlling use of the internet
and to the fact that Americans share the worldwide growth in enthusiasm for betting on
sports events despite its illegality in nearly all states.
In 1998 the total staked (in legal markets, but excluding lottery-type games based on
sports results) on sports worldwide is estimated to have been approximately US$36
billion. By 2003 this had grown by over half again, to just in excess of US$56 billion
(Global Betting and Gaming Consultants, 2005). In sports betting, between 5 and 10 per
cent of stakes is typically retained by the bookmaker, so that net turnover will have been
at least US$6 billion.
This large industry is, of course, dependent on major leagues in America and Europe
providing the high-profile sports product on which clients wish to bet. These sports
Sport and gambling 41
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:08 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
leagues, and particularly the English Premier Football League whose games are televised
throughout Asia, are therefore conferring substantial benefit on another industry, betting,
that produces a complementary good. Their ability to capture any profits generated
depends on whether they have legal and de facto control of relevant property rights, in
this case fixture lists used by the gambling industry. Potential revenue from control of such
rights is large. Football industry sources suggest that Far Eastern betting turnover (legal
and illegal) amounts to US$1 billion per weekend in season, with half of this staked on
English Premier League games. Even a small levy on these bets would generate very
significant revenue for the League.
The extension of World Trade Organization agreements to the area of intellectual prop-
erty rights has strengthened the legal position of sports leagues; and indeed fees for the
use of fixture lists have been negotiated successfully with, for example, the football-based
lottery in China. But immediate prospects for significant copyright revenue are poor
because betting is usually channelled through either an indigenous illegal sector or inter-
national operators whose clients are footloose and very sensitive to charges.
In the longer term it appears plausible that bookmaking will be regularised in the
important Asian markets. Singapore Pools made the first legal sports book in the region
when it introduced betting on local soccer in 1998. The Hong Kong Jockey Club was per-
mitted to offer football betting on English games from 2003. Both moves were in response
to a substantial leakage of expenditure to the illegal sector and to overseas bookmakers
(including, in the case of Hong Kong, to casino-based operations in Macau). Both met
with some success. Increasing internet penetration is likely to raise pressure on other coun-
tries in the region to provide for legal betting that keeps some of the turnover at home.
The English Premier League has invested heavily in promoting fan interest in the region,
with the payoff to date mainly in the form of broadcasting and merchandise income, but
it would be well placed, in the event of the gradual establishment of legal betting, and pro-
viding that countries adhere to commitments on intellectual property rights, to exploit
gambling as a further source of revenue. Competition would be likely to come from the
Premier leagues of Germany and Italy which are also popular betting vehicles (European
football’s other major league, that of Spain, is less popular because matches start at an
unfriendly time for viewers and bettors in Asia).
In the home markets of European leagues, it is already feasible to collect copyright fees.
In England, football claims a percentage of expenditure on the lottery-style football pools
and a turnover-related fee for the use of fixture lists by licensed betting offices. But,
notwithstanding that ‘football betting is the fastest-growing form of gambling in the UK’
(Mintel, 2001), fees are constrained by the increasing inability of bookmakers to pass on
increased costs in the face of international competition. Indeed, international competi-
tion forced a substantial reform of, and reduction in, betting taxation in 2001. In other
words, rents in bookmaking have been dissipated and there is less for the football indus-
try (as well as less for the government) to capture.
In this context, a feasible route for football to take is to create new betting products over
which football or its franchisees would have monopoly power. Interactive television offers
such opportunities. In Britain it is now possible and legal (subject to licence) for viewers
of a football game to be offered betting opportunities as the game progresses, for example
on whether a penalty just awarded will be converted. Selling such instant bets to a large
audience is possible only for the betting firm which is in partnership with the broadcaster
42 Handbook on the economics of sport
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:08 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
with rights to the game. Any monopoly profits that such bets offer will be factored into
bids for broadcast rights and therefore captured by the League. Similarly, bets could be
offered on large screens in the stadium during the game, with supporters responding by
text messaging. Again, the value of franchise rights to such an operation would reflect
monopoly power. The popularity of such new styles of bet remains to be demonstrated
but may depend on the extent to which the League is willing to be flexible in game design.
For example, could the game be paused to facilitate betting on the penalty kick or could
one even alter rules to create more penalties in a match? Similar issues have of course
arisen as sport has become increasingly dependent on television revenue. It is relevant to
note that the American sports that have been most ready to adapt game design to the
needs of broadcasters have achieved the highest rates of growth in broadcasting rights
income (Szymanski, 2003).
Possible Costs to Sport from Gambling
The principal source of concern here is that the prospect of betting gain, or bribery of
players or officials by bettors or bookmakers, will corrupt a sport and cause match fixing.
As with any illegal activity, it is hard to assess just how common the phenomenon is. A
number of authors, such as Crafts (1985) for British horse racing and Gandar et al. (1998)
for American basketball have demonstrated that movements in odds during the betting
period are good predictors of event outcomes. This is consistent with corruption since the
weight of money of those involved in any fix would drive the odds inwards from opening
values compiled by bookmakers on the basis of fundamentals such as team form and
quality. However, such movements could also result from the existence of any type of
insider information (such as knowledge of player injuries) or indeed are consistent with a
rational expectations perspective whereby the collective view of large numbers of bettors
is liable to be superior to that of any individual, no matter how skilled an odds-setter he
or she might be. This body of work cannot therefore be interpreted as evidence of wide-
spread corruption though movements of odds might be admissible as a further indicator
of the need for inquiry where unusual events are observed on the field.
More convincing evidence of widespread corruption in the particular case of US
college sports is provided by Wolfers (2002). For college basketball, the betting market
was not odds based. Rather, bets on all teams were at the same odds and related to whether
or not a team would beat ‘the spread’ announced for its game by the bookmaker. The
starting point for the analysis is that a team’s performance relative to the spread is a fore-
cast error and the distribution of such errors should be approximately normal. In fact,
across a sample of close to 30 000 matches, there was a statistically significant deviation
from normality such that, in games whose outcome was relatively close to the spread,
heavy favourites were much more likely to fail to beat, than to beat, the spread. This could
arise because teams winning comfortably relaxed their effort; but it could also be
explained by some teams actively choosing to win by less than they could. Athletes on
such teams were on the winning side on the court and at the same time profited if they
had bet against their own team in the spread market. This practice is termed ‘point
shaving’ and has been alleged in several betting scandals at US colleges. Wolfers’s data
raise the suspicion that about 10 per cent of teams engaged in point shaving. Concern over
such corruption has now led to Las Vegas sports books withdrawing from most betting
on amateur sport, though wagers remain possible in the illegal market.
Sport and gambling 43
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:08 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
Professional sport has also generated fixing scandals throughout its history. Apart from
perennial accusations concerning the integrity of horse racing, the most notorious affairs
include the attempt to fix baseball’s World Series in 1919 and the arrangement of match
results by players (paid by bookmakers from the illegal sector) in the top level of inter-
national cricket in the 1990s.
The contemporary cricket scandal (in a sport also notorious for corruption nearly 200
years ago) was used by Preston and Szymanski (2003) to illustrate a model designed to
show the circumstances in which players will accept bribes from illegal bookmakers.
Corruption was demonstrated to be more likely where there was (a) a large underground
betting market, (b) a low detection rate for cheating, (c) low player wages and (d) low prize
money or prestige for winning individual contests. All these conditions were present in
international one-day cricket, according to Preston and Szymanski.
Forrest and Simmons (2003) employed a different model of corruption that neverthe-
less yielded broadly similar conclusions. Adapting the general economic theory of crim-
inal behaviour proposed by Ehrlich (1996), they represented the risk-neutral athlete as
comparing the gain in wealth from a successful and undetected fix with the expected cost
of cheating. The latter comprised the expected value of financial loss (equal to the prob-
ability of detection multiplied by the financial penalty for fixing, which is likely to include
loss of income while suspended) and the disutility of cheating itself (moral discomfort
and loss of sporting glory through underachievement). Conclusions included that athletes
are more likely to agree to a fix, (a) the lower the chance of detection, (b) the lower the
player wage level and (c) the less the loss of sporting glory when they deliberately under-
perform. These propositions, very similar to those of Preston and Szymanski, are in one
sense obvious; but, as often in economic theory, a model yields a taxonomy of policy
approaches around which debate may be organised.
First, consider the probability of detection. This will differ across sports for technical
reasons and because sports governing bodies will invest in screening to an extent com-
mensurate with how important (financially) the result of the contest is: contests where the
marginal gain from winning is high are likely to be screened more rigorously, so chances
of detection will be higher in rich, high-profile sports. However, the probability of detec-
tion will vary also according to how well policed the betting market is and this is the basis
for the argument that it is in the public interest for betting to take place in a legal rather
than an illegal setting.
The generally prohibitive stance of American law has spawned an illegal betting indus-
try with turnover a hundred times larger than that of the legal sports books in Las Vegas
(Strumpf, 2003). Advocates of liberalisation argue that if this betting took place within a
legal industry, available nationwide, betting irregularities would be more readily drawn to
the attention of the authorities, thus deterring fixes. There is some force to this argument.
Point shaving cases on occasion came to light because they aroused the suspicion of Las
Vegas sports books. If an investigation is called for, legal bookmakers maintain records
that are likely to reveal whether insiders have been betting: Nevada state law requires all
bets over $3000 to be recorded and identification obtained for any bettor staking more
than $10 000 in 24 hours. On the other hand, well-organised betting rings are likely to be
able to distance the placing of a bet from the identity of the athletes arranging the fix.
This is not so in illegal markets. Strumpf examined the activities of a range of illegal oper-
ators in New Jersey. Each bookmaker focused on a small geographical area and served
44 Handbook on the economics of sport
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:08 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
clients with whom he had a long-term relationship. This is the most viable form of organ-
isation in an industry where either buyer or seller may build up substantial liability for
payment to the other but where these debts cannot be enforced in the courts. As a result,
illegal bookmaking firms know their clients well, know who their contacts are and can
recognise atypical betting behaviour at the micro level. Consequently, illegal bookmaking
is not likely to be an easy environment in which to place substantial bets associated with
a fix. Offshore internet betting firms are a greater danger to the extent that betting is more
impersonal there, which makes it unlikely that suspicion will be raised because of the
source of the wager. In the absence of a legal and only lightly taxed domestic betting
industry, internet substitutes are likely to develop and will be unpoliced outlets for bets
associated with match fixing.
The second determinant of the proportion of players who would agree to a fix at a
given level of financial gain is the level of player wages. In most sports, the penalty for a
player proven to have fixed a match is a lengthy, or lifetime, suspension. Plainly the result-
ing loss of earnings will differ markedly over time and across sports and casual evidence
suggests that this is a principal driver of how much betting-related corruption occurs in
different periods and different settings. It is striking that major league US sports and top
European soccer leagues have been almost devoid of betting scandal in the era of free
agency and high player wages, in contrast to their earlier history; that contemporary pro-
fessional cricket, where players have not won the same share of revenue as in other major
team sports (Preston and Szymanski, 2000), remains notorious for its corruption; and
that US college sports, where athletes are paid nothing at all, has generated the widest
concern of all.
Cricket merits further discussion since it is unique among the big international team
sports in that there is firm evidence of recent and very widespread corruption at the
very top of the game. While not played in as many countries as soccer, cricket never-
theless commands a large international following (one day’s play in an India–Pakistan
match in 2004 had a worldwide television audience estimated at 600 million). Why then
are its players so poorly paid relative to comparable sports? One factor is that, unlike
soccer and US sports, the bulk of the game’s revenue is generated by matches and series
between national teams rather than by domestic competitions (which attract only weak
public interest). As a result, national teams now play nearly constantly around the
world, with established players seldom appearing in domestic league matches. Players
entering this elite circuit are hired into a monopsonistic labour market because, with
few exceptions, an individual player is qualified to represent only one country. This
arrangement works to prevent players capturing the same proportion of broadcasting
and other revenue as in sports with more competitive labour markets. Cricket govern-
ing bodies are thereby able to maintain control of economic rents which are then typ-
ically channelled into subsidising otherwise unviable domestic leagues. Major reform of
this structure is likely to be necessary before rewards to players become commensurate
with the audiences that top-level international cricket can command. The risk of losing
wages of that order of magnitude would be likely to deter most players from associa-
tion with bookmakers.
Even in the highest-paid sports, however, some support from criminal law enforcement
is likely to be needed to eliminate corruption. Players near the end of their career and ref-
erees, who do not command the same rewards as players, may risk little financially by
Sport and gambling 45
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:08 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
trying to manipulate match outcomes to secure betting gain. High probability of detec-
tion is an effective deterrent to criminal malpractice in all fields and would be more likely
in this case if dedicated police units were charged with enforcement (DCMS, 2001).
Again, enforcement will be difficult if there is a large and liquid offshore sector through
which bets can be channelled.
The final proposition in the Forrest–Simmons model is that the amount of corruption
will be greater where underperformance on the field does not carry much loss of utility
for the player. This appears to have been true in the cricket case: Preston and Szymanski
(2003) made the point that the number of one-day internationals became so large that the
result of any one became unimportant to players, thus fostering a willingness to match
fix. Again the idea is consistent with the apparently high incidence of point shaving in US
college sports. Because handicap betting was offered, groups of players on a strong team
could conspire to score fewer points than they could have, win bets as a result, and still
enjoy being on the winning side. Handicap betting appears therefore to carry more risk of
corruption than odds-based betting systems.
Some other styles of betting have also been criticised as encouraging corruption.
‘Proposition bets’ relate not to the result of a game but to some aspect, for example the
identity of the first player to score a touchdown, or whether a particular batsman will
reach 50, or how many players are sent off in a soccer game. The controversy over this
style of bet arises because some propositions are much easier to manipulate than the
match result. Index betting firms in the UK had to withdraw a popular proposition bet
relating to the time at which the (soccer) ball was first put out of play because it was
alleged that players regularly kicked the ball into touch just after the game started simply
to win a bet. This was not only easy to fix but was acceptable to players since it was vir-
tually irrelevant to which team would win the match. The withdrawal of this particular
proposition bet perhaps indicates that the betting industry will be self-regulating in what
is permitted. Las Vegas sports books have low ceilings on the size of wager in the case of
proposition bets.
A fast-growing subsector of the gambling industry is that of the betting exchange.
Gaming companies gain their profit by (internet) matching of traders who indicate the
odds at which they would be willing to bet either that an event will happen or that it will
not. This enables anyone to play the role of a bookmaker by bidding as a seller (agreeing
to pay another party if the named event occurs and to collect from that party if the event
fails to occur). The rapid growth of betting exchanges has been of much concern to the
horse-racing industry because corrupt jockeys can now effectively wager that the horse
they control will lose. It was always possible to lose a race in the hope of betting gain but
the gain would follow only if a bet was placed on the correct rival horse. Corruption there-
fore now carries higher expected gain.
Established bookmakers argue for the banning of betting exchanges (to which they
have lost significant market share) because they corrupt the sport. The betting exchanges
counter that a ban would drive the exchange concept offshore and deprive the authorities
access to betting records that may be (indeed already have been) used to uncover corrup-
tion. The debate is familiar and symmetric with issues discussed in respect of other
financial products than betting. If the regulator prohibits, or imposes heavy taxes, on a
particular product, the money may move offshore where the authorities will find it hard
to protect the public interest and the interests of investors.
46 Handbook on the economics of sport
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:08 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
Betting Odds as Information
Last in this review, we consider whether the abundant data yielded by betting markets is
likely to be of general use in the work of sports economists. If the array of odds available
on sports events were interpretable as a set of unbiased probabilistic forecasts of out-
comes, the information could in principle be applied in many contexts. But, in practice, to
date, it has been used only to illuminate the issue of the importance of match-level
outcome uncertainty to attendance demand. Peel and Thomas (1988, 1992) for English
soccer, Peel and Thomas (1997) and Carmichael et al. (1999) for English rugby league,
Knowles et al. (1992) and Rascher (1999) for Major League Baseball and Welki and
Zlatoper (1999) for American football, have all sought to measure the influence of
outcome uncertainty by the use of betting odds or spreads.
The appeal of the procedure is obvious in that the cost of collecting data is now low,
given the availability of electronic odds archives, whereas the construction of statistical
models capable of generating efficient ex ante probabilistic forecasts is a formidable exer-
cise. Further, odds data appear to be at least as powerful as statistical models in forecast-
ing sporting outcomes (Boulier and Stekler, 2003 ; Forrest et al., 2005).
There are issues such as whether the uncertainty of outcome is best measured by the
probability of a home win or the difference in odds quoted on the teams or the deviation
in the ratio of the odds from one. But these are details relative to the fundamental issue
of whether the betting market is sufficiently efficient that the use of odds does not yield
misleading results from the attendance model.
Sauer (1998) surveys the voluminous literature on efficiency in wagering markets.
Findings appear similar to those in other financial markets. Prices are broadly efficient.
Some anomalies have been uncovered. Many of these disappear soon after being docu-
mented. A few (such as longshot bias in horse racing) are enduring. Among the biases
alleged to exist in the sports where odds have been used in attendance demand work are
home–away bias in rugby league (Simmons et al., 2003), longshot bias in baseball
(Woodland and Woodland, 1994, 2003) and ‘sentiment’ bias (whereby bookmakers distort
odds to take account of how many fans a team has) in soccer and American football
(Forrest and Simmons, 2002; Avery and Chevalier, 1999). It is, of course, understandable
if biases in odds occur because odds are set not to serve as forecasts but to maximise profit.
The crucial question is whether any bias is so pronounced as to undermine the results
of the attendance studies cited above. Forrest and Simmons (2002) estimated two versions
of an attendance demand model for soccer. One measured outcome uncertainty by refer-
ence to the ratio of the odds offered on the two teams. The other employed the same
measure, but for corrected odds. The correction was based on a first stage in which they
tested for, found and quantified biases in the odds.
Unfortunately, results from the two models were quite different. An audience prefer-
ence for outcome uncertainty emerged only when bias-corrected odds were used. Of
course, if statistically significant bias in the odds is found, more reliable results on the rela-
tionship between attendance and outcome uncertainty should be obtained by adjusting
the odds accordingly; but any error in the specification of the betting market model will
then be exported to the attendance demand model.
More research is needed. Sensitivity of the results to any violation of the assumption
of betting market efficiency clearly undermines the existing sports economics literature
employing betting odds. However, it would be surprising if these controversies were not
Sport and gambling 47
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:08 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
resolved, given the wealth of betting market data that still awaits exploitation by sports
economists.
References
Avery, C. and J. Chevalier (1999), ‘Identifying investor sentiment from price paths: the case of football betting’,
Journal of Business, 72, 493–521.
Boulier, B. and H. Stekler (2003), ‘Predicting the outcomes of National Football League games’, International
Journal of Forecasting, 19, 257–70.
Carmichael, F., J. Millington and R. Simmons (1999), ‘Elasticity of demand for rugby league attendance and
the impact of BSkyB’, Applied Economics Letters, 6 (12), 797–800.
Crafts, N. (1985), ‘Some evidence of insider trading in horse race betting in Britain’, Economica, 59, 278–98.
DCMS (2001), Gambling Review Report, London: Department for Culture, Media and Sport.
Ehrlich, I. (1996), ‘Crime, punishment and the market for offences’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (1),
43–67.
Forrest, D., J. Goddard and R. Simmons (2005), ‘Odds setters as forecasters: the case of English football’,
International Journal of Forecasting, 21, 551–64.
Forrest, D. and R. Simmons (2002), ‘Outcome uncertainty and attendance demand in sport: the case of English
soccer’, The Statistician, 51 (2), 229–41.
Forrest, D. and R. Simmons (2003), ‘Sport and gambling’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19 (4), 598–611.
Gandar, J., W. Dare, C. Brown and R. Zuber (1998), ‘Informed traders and price variations in the betting market
for professional basketball games’, Journal of Finance, 53, 385–401.
Global Betting and Gaming Consultants (2005), Double or Quits: 3rd Global Gaming Review, Global and
Gaming Consultants, www.gbgc.com.
Knowles, G., K. Sherony and M. Haupert (1992), ‘The demand for Major League Baseball: a test of the uncer-
tainty of outcome hypothesis’, The American Economist, 36 (2), 72–80.
Mintel (2001), On-Line Betting, Mintel Intelligence Report, London: Mintel International Group.
Munting, R. (1996), An Economic and Social History of Gambling, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Peel, D.A. and D.A. Thomas (1988), ‘Outcome uncertainty and the demand for football’, Scottish Journal of
Political Economy, 35 (3), 242–9.
Peel, D.A. and D.A.Thomas (1992), ‘The demand for football: some evidence on outcome uncertainty’,
Empirical Economics, 17, 323–31.
Peel, D.A. and D.A. Thomas (1997), ‘Handicaps, outcome uncertainty and attendance demand’, Applied
Economics Letters, 4 (6), 567–70.
Preston, I. and S. Szymanski (2000), ‘A blueprint for cricket’, Presentation to a meeting of the ESRC Economics
of Sports, Arts and Leisure Study Group, Imperial College, December.
Preston, I. and S. Szymanski (2003), ‘Cheating in contests’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19 (4), 612–24.
Rascher, D. (1999), ‘A test of the optimal positive production network externality in Major League Baseball’,
in J. Fizel, E. Gustafson and L. Hadley (eds), Sports Economics: Current Research, Westport, CT: Praeger,
27–45.
Sauer, R. (1998), ‘The economics of wagering markets’, Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 2021–64.
Simmons, R., D. Forrest and A. Curran (2003), ‘Efficiency in the handicap and betting markets for English
rugby league’, in L. Vaughan Williams (ed.), The Economics of Gambling, London and New York: Routledge,
114–34.
Skiena, S. (2001), Calculated Bets, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Strumpf, K.S. (2003), ‘Illegal sports bookmakers’, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, mimeo.
Szymanski, S. (2003), ‘Why have premium sports rights migrated to Pay TV in Europe but not in the US?’, pre-
sentation to International Association of Sport Economists conference, University of Neuchâtel,
Switzerland, May.
Welki, A. and T. Zlatoper (1999), ‘U.S. professional football game-day attendance’, Atlantic Economic Journal,
27 (3), 489–95.
Wolfers, J. (2002), ‘Point shaving corruption in NCAA basketball?’, mimeo, Stanford University.
Woodland, L. and B. Woodland (1994), ‘Market efficiency and the favourite-longshot bias: the baseball betting
market’, Journal of Finance, 49, 269–79.
Woodland, L. and B. Woodland (2003), ‘The reverse favourite-longshot bias and market efficiency in Major
League Baseball: an update’, Bulletin of Economic Research, 55, 113–23.
48 Handbook on the economics of sport
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:08 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
40 The economics of collegiate athletics
Karl W. Einolf
The Basic Purpose of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is as follows:
The competitive athletics programs of member institutions are designed to be a vital part of the
educational system. A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics
as an integral part of the educational programme and the athlete as an integral part of the
student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athlet-
ics and professional sports. (2003–4 Division I NCAA Manual
)
I – and many others – are concerned that all this college football money is turning college sports
into nothing more than a minor league for pro football rather than a legitimate educational activ-
ity for student athletes. (Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Senate Committee on the Judiciary Hearing,
Wednesday, 29 October 2003)
To examine the economics of collegiate sports in the United States, one must start with
the dichotomous perception of the mission of the NCAA. On one hand, the governing
body of intercollegiate athletics would like to be seen as the preserver of the amateur
status of its athletes. On the other, the NCAA generates tremendous wealth ($354 million
in revenue in 2002) and keeping its principal labour force from being paid protects its
interest in future revenue.
The NCAA is legally a non-profit organisation, and 65 per cent of NCAA Division I-A
athletics programmes do not make a profit as a separate business unit and are subsidised
by their educational institution. Of the programmes that do make a profit, half earn less
than $1.5 million dollars per year (Fulk, 2002). The few programmes that do make a
significant profit use the excess funds to enhance the educational opportunities at their
institutions.
The NCAA, in the spirit of maintaining the integrity of amateurism, requires that its
athletes are not paid for playing sports. The NCAA has an extensive list of rules for its
athletes. Athletes are allowed to make only a small sum of money (currently $2000) in
other employment throughout the year. Athletes must have attained a specific Grade
Point Average (GPA) and SAT score in order to compete their first year. Athletes may not
sign with an agent and still play collegiate sports. Once an athlete signs a letter of intent
to attend a school, he or she must go to that school or forgo a year of eligibility. Athletes
are only eligible for four consecutive years of collegiate play, although they are permitted
to skip a year of competition (a ‘red shirt year’) and only practise with their team. Athletes
are also not allowed to accept gifts, monetary or otherwise, in exchange for play.
Critics argue that the NCAA leads a cartel of colleges and universities that collectively
underpays its primary labour force in revenue-producing sports. The money that is saved
from not paying athletes is used to fund other sports, state-of-the-art athletic facilities,
academic programmes, and expensive coaches’ salaries. While the NCAA is a non-profit
organisation, it was able to distribute $187 million to Division I institutions in 2002 while
379
C
o
p
y
r
i
g
h
t
2
0
0
6
.
E
d
w
a
r
d
E
l
g
a
r
P
u
b
l
i
s
h
i
n
g
.
A
l
l
r
i
g
h
t
s
r
e
s
e
r
v
e
d
.
M
a
y
n
o
t
b
e
r
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
i
n
a
n
y
f
o
r
m
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
p
e
r
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
p
u
b
l
i
s
h
e
r
,
e
x
c
e
p
t
f
a
i
r
u
s
e
s
p
e
r
m
i
t
t
e
d
u
n
d
e
r
U
.
S
.
o
r
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
b
l
e
c
o
p
y
r
i
g
h
t
l
a
w
.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 10/29/2024 9:10 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY
AN: 182123 ; Wladimir Andreff, Stefan Szymanski.; Handbook on the Economics of Sport
Account: liberty.main.ehost
an additional $21.3 million paid for management expenses (including salaries paid to
NCAA executives). Television rights revenue brought in $237 million (NCAA, 2002).
There is no doubt that there is a lot of money in collegiate athletics, but the question is –
is the NCAA truly protecting the educational experience of the student-athlete or is it
really protecting the economic interests of its member institutions? Walter Byers,
Executive Director of the NCAA from 1951 to 1987, supervised the NCAA’s boom in
lucrative television contracts. He was not afraid to express the true meaning of ama-
teurism: ‘Collegiate amateurism is not a moral issue. It is an economic camouflage for
monopoly practice’ (Rushin, 1997, p. 73).
Should college athletes be paid? Athletes generate considerable revenue for their
schools. More importantly, three programmes in particular have the potential to bring
profit to their institutions: men’s football, men’s basketball and women’s basketball. Of
the 112 Division I-A football programmes detailed in Table 40.1, 62.5 per cent generated
a profit from their programme. According to the NCAA, the men’s basketball programme
at 66 per cent of Division I-A programmes claimed a profit as a separate business unit in
fiscal year 2001. Women’s basketball programmes were not as successful, however, as only
5 per cent of Division I-A programmes generated a profit (Fulk, 2002).
Clearly, there is a great deal of competition for athletes coming out of high school.
Coaches who can ‘work the living room’ and convince an athlete (and their family) to sign
are a very valuable commodity for today’s college and university. These coaches are very
well paid. Paying the athletes outright – instead of convincing them that attending state
university will benefit their future income – will seriously change the economic landscape
of college athletics. Bidding wars for players would ensue, coaches would be paid less, and
many of the spillover benefits of profitable athletics programmes would disappear.
The reality is that the market for undergraduate students, athlete and non-athlete, is
quite competitive. Students select colleges and universities based on their academic and
athletic resources. At many NCAA institutions, athletics programmes fund these
resources. There is a lot at stake for the institutions that benefit the most from the NCAA.
Certainly, these schools oppose paying players. While their current use of NCAA funds
may be admirable, paying athletes in revenue-producing sports may cause many of the
academic and athletic resources, their competitive advantage, to disappear.
What is the intent of NCAA member institutions? Are they really trying to enhance
the educational experience of the student-athlete or are they more focused on trying to
maximise profits in revenue-producing sports to help fund other academic and athletic
380 Handbook on the economics of sport
Table 40.1 Four-class graduation rates at Division I institutions
Male Rate (%) Female Rate (%)
All male students 56 All female students 61
All male student-athletes 54 All female student-athletes 70
Men’s basketball 43 Women’s basketball 65
Baseball 47 Women’s CC/track 66
Football 53 All other women’s sports 72
Men’s CC/track 57
All other men’s sports 60
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:10 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
opportunities? To examine which objective is dominant, one may compare the graduation
rates of athletes in revenue-producing sports with the graduation rates of a typical student
at these institutions.
Table 40.1 exhibits the average graduation rates for students at 328 Division I institutions
from the NCAA 2004 Graduation Rate Report. The average four-class graduation rate for
all male students is 56 per cent, and for all female students it is 61 per cent. At this aggre-
gate level, only three sports report a student-athlete graduation rate lower than the average
student: men’s basketball (43 per cent), baseball (47 per cent), and football (53 per cent).
While the overall difference in the football athletes’ graduation rate is not significantly
lower than the average student, graduation rates are much lower at profitable football
institutions. Table 40.2 compares the graduation rates of all students and football players
at 112 Division I-A football programmes. The table also displays the revenue and expenses
of each of these programmes. Table 40.3 summarises Table 40.2 by comparing the average
graduation rate at schools that generate more than $10 million in football revenue with
those schools that generate less than $10 million. The difference is striking. Football
players at the big revenue schools are less likely to graduate when compared to the regular
student at their institutions. The difference is even more pronounced in Table 40.4 where
the top 10 revenue-producing programmes are compared to the bottom 10 programmes.
Table 40.5 (below) displays the average graduation rate for each Division I-A football con-
ference. Again, the difference between graduation rates for regular students and football
players is significant for the high-revenue conferences. It does make one wonder whether
Senator Hatch’s comment that collegiate athletics turning into a minor league for profes-
sional football is accurate.
It is necessary to point out that the graduation rates among football players are not
significantly different in Tables 40.2 and 40.3. The revenue production of the football pro-
gramme does not seem to have an effect on the average graduation rate of football players.
However, one cannot ignore the fact that the higher football revenue schools do better at
retaining and graduating all students. Unfortunately graduation rates only capture the
percentage of incoming freshmen that actually end up graduating from that institution
within a six-year period. If students transfer from one institution and graduate from
another, they are not part of the statistic. Many of the lower football revenue schools may
be admitting students who are not prepared for college and do not graduate. However,
many students at lower football revenue schools may also be transferring to higher foot-
ball revenue schools where greater resources exist for both academics and athletics. Thus,
the stakes are even greater for a college or university to maintain the success of its revenue-
producing football programme.
Member institutions that are on the short end of the NCAA’s revenue distribution
system are often very critical of the NCAA. Tulane University, for example, has trad-
itionally been a model of the NCAA stated institutional mission to foster the athlete
within the broader educational experience. Tulane has a relatively high graduation rate for
both athletes and non-athletes. However, as a member of the Conference USA, Tulane
traditionally receives a small share of NCAA revenue and is essentially shut out of an
opportunity to play in a high-revenue Bowl Game. In 1998, Tulane went undefeated and
yet was not invited to play in one of the top Bowls.
The NCAA’s top conferences – Pacific 10, Big 10, South-eastern (SEC), Atlantic Coast
(ACC), Big East and Big 12 – corner the market on the four largest revenue-producing
The economics of collegiate athletics 381
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:10 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
382
T
ab
le
4
0.
2
D
iv
is
io
n
I-
A
fo
ot
ba
ll
re
ve
nu
e,
ex
pe
ns
es
a
nd
g
ra
du
at
io
n
ra
te
s
C
on
fe
re
nc
e
Sc
ho
ol
F
ou
r-
cl
as
s
gr
ad
ua
ti
on
r
at
es
(
%
)
R
ev
en
ue
E
xp
en
se
s
F
oo
tb
al
l
A
ll
F
oo
tb
al
l
D
iff
er
en
ce
($
)
($
)
pr
ofi
t
($
)
st
ud
en
ts
B
IG
T
E
N
O
hi
o
St
at
e
56
41
–1
5
47
2
0
5
64
8
11
96
3
81
2
35
2
4
1
8
3
6
SE
C
A
rk
an
sa
s
46
2
6
–2
0
40
2
0
9
41
0
8
25
6
37
7
31
95
3
03
3
SE
C
T
en
ne
ss
ee
58
41
–1
7
40
1
9
2
2
4
5
1
1
44
3
84
4
28
74
8
40
1
SE
C
A
la
ba
m
a
59
52
–7
3
5
64
3
68
9
12
3
1
9
0
1
6
2
3
32
4
67
3
SE
C
F
lo
ri
da
71
44
–2
7
35
4
8
2
54
0
9
49
6
87
4
25
9
8
5
66
6
B
IG
1
2
N
eb
ra
sk
a
51
5
7
6
3
2
60
9
23
1
9
8
8
9
4
8
6
22
71
9
74
5
IN
D
E
P
E
N
D
E
N
T
N
ot
re
D
am
e
94
81
–1
3
32
0
1
5
8
9
4
11
31
7
77
5
20
6
9
8
11
9
SE
C
G
eo
rg
ia
6
7
62
–5
31
3
6
9
8
0
3
6
33
5
70
1
25
0
3
4
10
2
SE
C
A
ub
ur
n
67
44
–
2
3
31
20
5
03
5
10
25
5
24
8
20
94
9
78
7
B
IG
T
E
N
M
ic
hi
ga
n
83
46
–3
7
29
52
1
06
2
9
51
2
65
7
20
0
0
8
40
5
SE
C
L
SU
52
40
–1
2
29
48
8
23
2
9
06
2
3
7
2
20
42
5
86
0
PA
C
1
0
W
as
hi
ng
to
n
70
63
–7
28
70
1
50
3
12
86
9
36
2
1
5
83
2
14
1
B
IG
T
E
N
P
en
n
St
at
e
80
76
–4
27
96
8
4
0
7
9
91
9
99
9
18
04
8
40
8
SE
C
V
an
de
rb
ilt
83
84
1
27
39
8
18
6
9
83
0
3
3
5
1
7
56
7
85
1
B
IG
1
2
T
ex
as
69
38
–3
1
26
64
8
95
4
1
39
0
14
5
25
25
8
80
9
B
IG
1
2
T
ex
as
A
&
M
72
49
–2
3
23
16
9
18
6
1
1
16
4
10
6
12
00
5
08
0
B
IG
1
2
O
kl
ah
om
a
51
3
3
–1
8
22
19
7
98
0
10
06
5
28
1
12
1
3
2
69
9
B
IG
T
E
N
W
is
co
ns
in
75
52
–2
3
2
0
60
8
59
5
8
3
5
6
06
8
12
25
2
52
7
SE
C
K
en
tu
ck
y
56
32
–
2
4
20
56
5
17
8
9
89
0
91
6
1
0
67
4
26
2
PA
C
1
0
A
ri
zo
na
S
ta
te
4
9
44
–5
20
1
6
0
27
2
8
89
1
05
3
11
26
9
21
9
A
C
C
C
le
m
so
n
71
53
–
1
8
20
00
3
97
8
9
60
8
3
7
3
1
0
39
5
60
5
PA
C
1
0
U
SC
73
61
–1
2
19
99
8
76
7
1
3
15
5
38
3
6
8
4
3
3
8
4
SE
C
So
ut
h
C
ar
ol
in
a
58
51
–7
19
8
9
3
3
5
2
6
69
4
94
4
13
19
8
40
8
B
IG
E
A
ST
Sy
ra
cu
se
75
8
3
8
18
56
8
16
4
15
24
3
96
8
3
32
4
19
6
B
IG
T
E
N
Il
lin
oi
s
77
52
–
2
5
18
20
3
84
2
8
75
2
76
9
9
45
1
07
3
B
IG
T
E
N
M
ic
hi
ga
n
St
at
e
67
41
–2
6
18
20
0
28
0
8
36
7
8
5
1
9
83
2
42
9
B
IG
T
E
N
P
ur
du
e
63
58
–5
18
05
6
65
1
7
62
2
18
0
10
43
4
47
1
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:10 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
383
B
IG
E
A
ST
M
ia
m
i (
F
la
.)
63
49
–
1
4
18
03
2
52
9
12
23
8
8
4
9
5
79
3
68
0
B
IG
1
2
C
ol
or
ad
o
6
5
43
–
2
2
17
90
3
03
4
9
6
7
4
64
0
8
22
8
39
4
PA
C
1
0
St
an
fo
rd
92
8
2
–1
0
17
35
8
49
4
11
21
3
97
7
6
1
4
4
51
7
PA
C
1
0
U
C
L
A
81
63
–1
8
17
27
5
93
2
9
7
9
5
33
1
7
48
0
60
1
A
C
C
F
lo
ri
da
S
ta
te
62
4
9
–1
3
15
78
9
31
5
7
54
9
89
9
8
23
9
41
6
PA
C
1
0
O
re
go
n
5
8
64
6
15
73
1
80
3
10
92
7
60
8
4
8
0
4
19
5
PA
C
1
0
O
re
go
n
St
at
e
57
35
–2
2
15
59
2
38
5
6
73
0
53
2
8
86
1
85
3
B
IG
T
E
N
Io
w
a
64
57
–
7
15
27
4
10
7
9
03
2
12
4
6
24
1
98
3
A
C
C
N
or
th
C
ar
ol
in
a
80
5
3
–2
7
15
15
2
38
4
9
34
4
42
0
5
80
7
9
6
4
B
IG
E
A
ST
P
it
ts
bu
rg
h
62
35
–2
7
14
77
7
77
1
8
98
6
20
4
5
79
1
56
7
B
IG
1
2
K
an
sa
s
St
at
e
53
57
4
14
74
1
37
5
83
9
90
5
13
90
1
47
0
B
IG
E
A
ST
V
ir
gi
ni
a
T
ec
h
72
49
–2
3
13
61
2
41
0
9
98
2
66
1
3
62
9
74
9
B
IG
E
A
ST
B
os
to
n
C
ol
le
ge
86
79
–7
13
52
7
69
3
10
62
4
36
8
2
90
3
32
5
B
IG
1
2
T
ex
as
T
ec
h
49
58
9
13
48
9
64
3
8
86
3
39
9
4
62
6
24
4
B
IG
T
E
N
N
or
th
w
es
te
rn
92
83
–9
13
48
8
67
2
8
13
0
33
3
5
35
8
33
9
A
C
C
V
ir
gi
ni
a
92
7
6
–1
6
12
77
1
94
4
9
19
1
44
1
3
58
0
50
3
SE
C
M
is
si
ss
ip
pi
53
52
–1
12
30
1
43
1
6
18
2
08
1
6
11
9
35
0
PA
C
1
0
A
ri
zo
na
54
53
–1
12
03
2
83
7
7
82
5
90
4
4
20
6
93
3
B
IG
E
A
ST
W
es
t
V
ir
gi
ni
a
55
48
–7
11
81
7
01
6
5
48
2
20
8
6
33
4
80
8
B
IG
T
E
N
M
in
ne
so
ta
51
43
–8
11
74
9
29
4
7
60
1
81
0
4
14
7
48
4
SE
C
M
is
si
ss
ip
pi
S
ta
te
5
2
64
12
11
72
1
31
2
5
43
0
30
5
6
29
1
00
7
A
C
C
G
eo
rg
ia
T
ec
h
68
49
–1
9
11
49
7
84
3
5
75
0
64
0
5
74
7
20
3
B
IG
T
E
N
In
di
an
a
68
72
4
10
87
8
35
3
7
56
9
80
0
3
30
8
55
3
B
IG
1
2
O
kl
ah
om
a
St
at
e
51
38
–1
3
10
70
3
78
9
5
83
5
66
9
4
86
8
12
0
C
-U
SA
L
ou
is
vi
lle
32
38
6
10
55
8
68
0
5
76
2
02
4
4
79
6
65
6
B
IG
1
2
Io
w
a
St
at
e
63
47
–1
6
10
28
6
40
7
6
18
1
99
1
4
10
4
41
6
PA
C
1
0
W
as
hi
ng
to
n
St
at
e
60
57
–3
9
93
4
20
0
7
09
8
26
0
2
83
5
94
0
A
C
C
N
or
th
C
ar
ol
in
a
St
at
e
63
47
–1
6
9
92
2
77
7
4
30
7
04
1
5
61
5
73
6
M
O
U
N
T
A
IN
W
E
ST
B
ri
gh
am
Y
ou
ng
72
12
–6
0
9
88
0
94
2
10
37
7
37
8
–4
96
43
6
A
C
C
M
ar
yl
an
d
65
5
0
–1
5
8
74
9
98
5
7
85
4
31
7
89
5
66
8
B
IG
1
2
M
is
so
ur
i
6
3
38
–2
5
8
55
3
99
3
4
56
6
30
6
3
98
7
68
7
PA
C
1
0
C
al
ifo
rn
ia
83
50
–3
3
8
52
1
04
1
8
3
8
1
23
9
13
9
80
2
B
IG
1
2
K
an
sa
s
55
45
–1
0
7
98
1
02
7
5
87
2
63
3
2
10
8
39
4
B
IG
1
2
B
ay
lo
r
69
75
6
6
54
1
08
2
5
83
7
72
4
70
3
35
8
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:10 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
384
T
ab
le
4
0.
2
(c
on
ti
nu
ed
)
C
on
fe
re
nc
e
Sc
ho
ol
F
ou
r-
cl
as
s
gr
ad
ua
ti
on
r
at
es
(
%
)
R
ev
en
ue
E
xp
en
se
s
F
oo
tb
al
l
A
ll
F
oo
tb
al
l
D
iff
er
en
ce
($
)
($
)
pr
ofi
t
($
)
st
ud
en
ts
A
C
C
D
uk
e
93
83
–1
0
6
41
5
09
8
6
26
2
77
7
15
2
32
1
M
O
U
N
T
A
IN
W
E
ST
C
ol
or
ad
o
St
at
e
62
41
–2
1
6
15
8
98
0
6
15
2
81
6
6
16
4
M
O
U
N
T
A
IN
W
E
ST
Sa
n
D
ie
go
S
ta
te
36
40
4
5
92
8
12
9
5
16
7
08
2
76
1
04
7
W
A
C
SM
U
71
64
–7
5
90
4
24
1
5
90
4
24
1
0
A
C
C
W
ak
e
F
or
es
t
87
76
–1
1
5
66
2
82
8
6
11
4
06
3
–4
51
23
5
C
-U
SA
E
as
t
C
ar
ol
in
a
52
59
7
5
58
1
99
3
5
08
5
08
7
49
6
90
6
M
O
U
N
T
A
IN
W
E
ST
U
ta
h
47
36
–1
1
5
57
6
68
7
4
40
9
88
6
1
16
6
80
1
M
A
C
M
ar
sh
al
l
34
51
17
4
80
3
82
4
4
31
7
97
1
48
5
85
3
B
IG
E
A
ST
R
ut
ge
rs
73
46
–2
7
4
78
4
61
3
6
85
8
79
3
–2
07
4
18
0
C
-U
SA
C
in
ci
nn
at
i
45
43
–2
4
64
5
28
3
5
80
6
33
6
–1
16
1
05
3
W
A
C
H
aw
ai
i
53
57
4
4
29
2
90
8
4
34
5
66
4
–5
2
75
6
SU
N
B
E
LT
Id
ah
o
52
42
–1
0
4
11
9
44
6
3
19
2
06
8
92
7
37
8
M
O
U
N
T
A
IN
W
E
ST
U
N
LV
35
23
–1
2
3
93
9
10
6
4
65
2
44
7
–7
13
34
1
B
IG
E
A
ST
T
em
pl
e
44
30
–1
4
3
70
1
43
7
7
02
8
22
1
–3
32
6
78
4
W
A
C
B
oi
se
S
ta
te
24
48
24
3
61
4
77
2
3
23
5
86
6
37
8
90
6
C
-U
SA
So
ut
he
rn
M
is
s.
53
62
9
3
51
4
78
6
3
80
4
51
3
–2
89
72
7
SU
N
B
E
LT
M
id
dl
e
T
en
ne
ss
ee
S
ta
te
37
27
–1
0
3
35
6
35
2
3
35
6
35
2
0
M
A
C
M
ia
m
i (
O
H
)
80
53
–2
7
3
30
9
49
3
3
31
9
44
0
–9
94
7
C
-U
SA
M
em
ph
is
33
46
13
3
28
5
39
8
5
26
8
78
7
–1
98
3
38
9
W
A
C
T
ul
sa
58
66
8
3
19
5
50
0
3
91
9
00
7
–7
23
50
7
W
A
C
N
ev
ad
a
47
39
–8
3
19
4
37
5
2
85
8
74
5
33
5
63
0
C
-U
SA
T
C
U
64
56
–8
3
15
1
87
5
4
50
0
39
2
–1
34
8
51
7
C
-U
SA
H
ou
st
on
36
34
–2
3
11
0
64
8
5
19
6
38
4
–2
08
5
73
6
W
A
C
Sa
n
Jo
se
S
ta
te
36
27
–9
3
02
3
67
9
2
88
8
80
7
13
4
87
2
M
O
U
N
T
A
IN
W
E
ST
N
ew
M
ex
ic
o
41
37
–4
2
69
3
93
6
3
72
4
08
8
–1
03
0
15
2
C
-U
SA
T
ul
an
e
73
76
3
2
64
6
74
3
6
38
0
66
8
–3
73
3
92
5
M
A
C
E
as
te
rn
M
ic
hi
ga
n
35
47
12
2
60
4
45
2
2
92
3
63
0
–3
19
17
8
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:10 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
385
M
A
C
C
en
tr
al
M
ic
hi
ga
n
50
68
18
2
55
9
17
6
2
55
9
17
6
0
W
A
C
U
T
E
P
25
34
9
2
53
6
88
9
2
98
5
36
5
–4
48
47
6
W
A
C
L
ou
is
ia
na
T
ec
h
50
54
4
2
45
3
75
0
3
24
1
72
6
–
7
87
97
6
M
O
U
N
T
A
IN
W
E
ST
W
yo
m
in
g
52
49
–3
2
36
3
63
9
2
81
2
29
2
–4
48
65
3
M
A
C
C
en
tr
al
F
lo
ri
da
49
32
–1
7
2
29
8
27
7
3
29
8
42
5
–1
00
0
14
8
IN
D
E
P
E
N
D
E
N
T
U
ta
h
St
at
e
46
49
3
2
26
3
20
6
2
61
5
75
1
–3
52
54
5
W
A
C
R
ic
e
90
82
–8
1
87
8
58
7
5
63
2
87
8
–3
75
4
29
1
SU
N
B
E
LT
N
ew
M
ex
ic
o
St
at
e
45
49
4
1
86
9
46
3
2
81
7
08
6
–9
47
62
3
SU
N
B
E
LT
N
or
th
T
ex
as
38
39
1
1
84
2
99
9
2
83
2
39
6
–9
89
39
7
M
A
C
W
es
te
rn
M
ic
hi
ga
n
54
62
8
1
59
7
32
3
3
15
7
54
0
–1
56
0
21
7
IN
D
E
P
E
N
D
E
N
T
C
on
ne
ct
ic
ut
69
51
–1
8
1
32
1
68
2
4
80
8
34
4
–3
48
6
66
2
C
-U
SA
U
A
B
35
53
18
1
27
4
07
9
4
42
8
80
3
–3
15
4
72
4
SU
N
B
E
LT
A
rk
an
sa
s
St
at
e
34
39
5
1
24
9
51
4
3
30
5
00
3
–2
05
5
48
9
IN
D
E
P
E
N
D
E
N
T
T
ro
y
St
at
e
50
48
–2
1
19
0
13
4
1
45
8
64
7
–2
68
51
3
SU
N
B
E
LT
L
ou
is
ia
na
-M
on
ro
e
29
57
28
1
18
5
77
5
1
87
0
34
0
–6
84
56
5
M
A
C
B
ow
lin
g
G
re
en
59
49
–1
0
1
09
0
96
8
2
47
5
85
7
–1
38
4
88
9
M
A
C
B
al
l S
ta
te
47
71
24
1
06
7
87
8
2
74
1
66
7
–1
67
3
78
9
M
A
C
A
kr
on
36
38
2
99
6
91
9
2
73
5
64
9
–1
73
8
73
0
M
A
C
K
en
t
St
at
e
44
51
7
98
9
36
8
2
70
4
05
8
–1
71
4
69
0
SU
N
B
E
LT
L
ou
is
ia
na
-L
af
ay
et
te
28
34
6
97
3
19
5
2
46
6
98
6
–1
49
3
79
1
M
A
C
To
le
do
38
59
21
97
0
67
2
2
70
4
07
8
–1
73
3
40
6
M
A
C
N
or
th
er
n
Il
lin
oi
s
49
40
–9
92
3
81
0
2
65
0
59
2
–1
72
6
78
2
M
A
C
O
hi
o
70
55
–1
5
77
6
51
6
2
76
1
33
3
–1
98
4
81
7
M
A
C
B
uff
al
o
55
52
–3
55
0
26
5
2
76
4
24
6
–2
21
3
98
1
S
ou
rc
e:
20
03
N
C
A
A
R
ep
or
t
on
G
ra
du
at
io
n
R
at
es
(
w
w
w
.n
ca
a.
or
g)
a
nd
C
om
pi
le
d
R
ep
or
ts
o
f
R
ev
en
ue
a
nd
E
xp
en
se
s
fr
om
e
ac
h
in
di
vi
du
al
in
st
it
ut
io
n’
s
20
02
E
A
D
A
(
E
qu
it
y
in
A
th
le
ti
cs
D
is
cl
os
ur
e
A
ct
)
N
C
A
A
R
ep
or
t.
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:10 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
Bowl Games. The current Bowl Championship Series (BCS) system places the conference
champion from each of these six conferences into six of the eight available slots in the top
Bowls. Any other Division I-A team may fill the remaining two spots, but, since the BCS
system’s inception in 1997, no team outside of the top six conferences has played in a BCS
Bowl Game. Table 40.5 exhibits the distribution of BCS revenue for the 2002–03 season.
386 Handbook on the economics of sport
Table 40.3 Comparison of graduation rates and football programme revenue
Football revenue
Greater than $10 m Less than $10 m
Number of schools 53 59
Percent that profit from football 100% 29%
Average graduation rate of all students 65.43% 52.08%
Average graduation rate of football players 53.58% 49.12%
Difference –11.85% –2.97%
Table 40.4 Comparison of graduation rates and top and bottom 10 football
programmes (%)
Football revenue
Top 10 Bottom 10
Percent that profit from football 100 0
Average graduation rate of all students 65.20 45.50
Average graduation rate of football players 49.40 50.60
Difference –15.80 5.10
Table 40.5 Comparison of graduation rates by conference
Conference Average graduation rate (%) Average conference school ($)
All students Football Difference Revenue Expenses Profit
SEC 60.17 49.33 –11 27 955 868 8 766 501 19 189 367
BIG TEN 70.55 56.45 –14 21 014 083 8 802 673 12 211 410
BIG 12 59.25 48.17 –11 16 235 475 6 681 774 9 553 701
PAC 10 67.70 57.20 –11 16 530 723 9 688 865 6 841 859
ACC 75.67 59.56 –16 11 774 017 7 331 441 4 442 576
INDEPENDENT 64.75 57.25 –8 9 197 729 5 050 129 4 147 600
BIG EAST 66.25 52.38 –14 12 352 704 9 555 659 2 797 045
MOUNTAIN 49.29 34.00 –15 5 220 203 5 327 998 –107 796
WEST
WAC 50.44 52.33 2 3 343 856 3 890 255 –546 400
SUN BELT 37.57 41.00 3 2 085 249 2 834 319 –749 070
C-USA 47.00 51.89 5 4 196 609 5 136 999 –940 390
MAC 50.00 52.00 2 1 752 782 2 936 690 –1 183 909
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:10 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
The Pacific 10 and the Big 10 each received the greatest share because the two at-large
selections came from these conferences. Tulane University could secure a greater share for
Conference USA, but they would have to be chosen as one of the at-large teams. Yet
without a single defeat in 1998, Tulane was not selected to play in a BCS Bowl Game.
In October 2003, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing to examine
the competitive and economic effects of the NCAA’s BCS system. The committee held the
hearing to begin an investigation into whether the system violates antitrust laws. The
financial distribution system, as shown in Table 40.6, clearly favours the top six confer-
ences. It is no surprise that the schools in the top six conferences do not wish to share a
greater piece of the BCS pie with the other Division I-A football conferences. These funds
help to bring greater academic and athletic resources to their institutions and help to make
these institutions more attractive to prospective students (their future customers). In his
testimony before the committee, Myles Brand, President of the NCAA, stated: ‘Although
there currently is some revenue sharing that takes place, the large majority goes to those
who make the greatest commitment and whom the market rewards. In other words, the
current revenue structure is a result of the free-market at work’.1 One wonders whether
the recruiting of athletes with the intent to graduate them at a lower rate than regular stu-
dents is also part of the NCAA’s ‘free-market’ system.
During the senate hearing, University of Nebraska Chancellor, Harvey Pearlman,
remarked that the BCS revenue-sharing system has little impact on the economics
of college athletics. The net BCS distribution of about $1.2 million to Nebraska in 2002
The economics of collegiate athletics 387
Table 40.6 BCS revenue distribution, 2002–2003
Revenue ($) Distribution ($)
Television and 72 000 000 Pacific 10 21 477 977
title sponsorships Big 10 21 062 222
Revenue from: Southeastern 16 562 222
Fiesta Bowl 4 420 000 Atlantic Coast 16 562 222
Sugar Bowl 4 400 000 Big East 16 562 222
Orange Bowl 4 600 000 Big 12 16 977 977
Rose Bowl 1 380 000 Western Athletic 960 000
Rose Bowl payout 27 924 842 Mountain West 960 000
Conference USA 960 000Total BCS revenue 114 724 842
Mid-American 960 000
Big Sky 180 000
Atlantic 10 180 000
Mid-Eastern 180 000
Gateway 180 000
Ohio Valley 180 000
Southwestern Athletic 180 000
Southland 180 000
Southern 180 000
Sunbelt 240 000
Total BCS distribution 114 724 842
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:10 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
represented only 2 per cent of its entire athletics budget. He stated that the university col-
lects more than twice as much during one home football game. Changing the BCS distri-
bution to a completely even share would only net about $750 000 to each Division I-A
athletics programme.2 The change would certainly not affect the balance of power;
however, the additional funds would be a windfall for a school like Tulane University. The
amount would be ten times as much as it currently receives from the BCS distribution.
While Chancellor Pearlman may claim that moving to equal sharing of NCAA and
BCS moneys would not significantly change Division I-A athletics, he still opposes any
change to the current system. The NCAA and the schools in the top six conferences are
extremely protective of their current financial arrangement. A move by the NCAA to
create equity across Division I-A schools will only hurt the University of Nebraska and
most other schools in the top six conferences. The schools in these conferences banded
together to protect their collective financial interests. The NCAA acts as the overseer of
these protective units. The University of Nebraska can realise large paydays from its home
football games, because it plays other ‘powerhouse’ schools in the Big 12 conference. If
the NCAA were to somehow allow other Division I-A schools access to schools in the top
six conferences, the NCAA’s product would become watered down. Television revenue
would decrease, attendance would drop, and the interest in Bowl games at the end of the
season would wane. The NCAA is not going to do anything to disrupt its current system.
The NCAA, however, cannot have it both ways. They cannot advocate amateurism in
collegiate sports while at the same time allowing their top revenue-producing programmes
to be a minor league in both football and men’s basketball. It is clear that most of the top
programmes are more concerned about keeping their revenue and less concerned about
graduating their student-athletes. In his 1999 book, Unpaid Professionals, Andrew
Zimbalist recommends that the NCAA actually takes the drastic step to professionalise
collegiate sports. The schools in the big six conferences would become a minor league, pay
its players, and manage their football and basketball programmes as professional sports
franchises. The schools that choose not to enter the minor leagues will be run in the true
spirit of the NCAA’s mission: ‘to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of
the educational program’. This way, the NCAA can have it both ways. The split person-
ality of the NCAA ends and the true sense of amateurism is preserved.
Notes
1. Testimony of Dr Myles Brand, President, National Collegiate Athletic Association, Senate Committee on
the Judiciary
Hearing, October 29, 2003.
2. Testimony of Harvey Pearlman, Chancellor, University of Nebraska, Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Hearing, October 29, 2003.
References
Fulk, Daniel L. (2002), Revenue and Expenses of Division I and II Intercollegiate Athletics Programs, Published
by the NCAA at www.ncaa.org.
NCAA (2002), Membership Report, Published by the NCAA at www.ncaa.org.
Rushin, Steve (1997), ‘Inside the moat’, Sports Illustrated, March 3, p. 73.
Senate Committee on the Judiciary Hearing (2003), ‘BCS or bust: competitive and economic effects of the Bowl
Championship Series on and off the field’, Transcript, http://judiciary.senate.gov/.
Zimbalist, Andrew (1999), Unpaid Professionals: Commercialism and Conflict in Big-Time College Sports,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
388 Handbook on the economics of sport
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:10 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
25 Sport and financin
g
Wladimir Andreff
Sport and money enjoy a long-lasting and necessary mutual relationship. Where sport is
competitive, it offers a sports spectacle that requires finance for its organisation, but can
bring in substantial income. Sports participation itself has become an act of individual
consumption, bringing in its training expenses from households for sports goods and ser-
vices. Sport development and sporting events are of concern for both central and local
(regional) governments, which allocate a part of their budget to sports financing (Andreff
and Nys, 2002). This chapter covers the macroeconomic finance of the overall sports
economy at a national and regional level in Europe. Financing team sports and the finance
of a specific athlete are dealt with elsewhere in this book.1 The focus here is on the distri-
bution between public and private sports finance. Some examples show that sport – even
the so-called amateur sport – is increasingly subject to a purely financial rationale which
threatens the survival of a traditional sporting ethic. On the other hand, North American
sports finance concentrates on professional sports. Nevertheless, increasing amounts of
money do flow into American college sports. Due to their capacity to attract more finance,
some college sports are now on the brink of professionalisation.
Financing the Overall Sports Economy in Europe
Money flows into the sports economy from four major, though uneven, sources in
European countries. Sports clubs’ organisations and federations supply sporting activ-
ities. Together with the sports media, they all basically offer sports services while retailers,
wholesalers and manufacturers supply sports goods. In return, they earn revenues from
the following sources of finance: households, the central government, local governments
and enterprises (media, sponsors, patrons and financiers). A European survey of sports
financing (Andreff et al., 1994) highlighted, for the year 1990, a basically comparable
structure of sports finance in all sampled countries (Table 25.1). Overall sports finance
ranged from 0.56 per cent (Denmark) to 3.47 per cent (Switzerland) of GDP. In all
countries, private funds overrode public financing of sport, including in the two forme
r
socialist economies, Hungary and the Czech Republic, whereas – except in Portugal –
households were the main contributors to sports finance, and local governments provided
more money to sport than the central government (except in Hungary). Thus, a two-pillar
financing model emerges, based on households and local authorities. Beyond these com-
monalties, some countries have a higher than average share of the central government’s
sports financing – Hungary, France, Portugal and Italy – while the central government
finance is negligible compared to local government finance in Germany, Switzerland, the
Scandinavian countries and the UK. The Scandinavian countries, Germany and France
enjoy the highest share of local government financing in overall sports finance.
Enterprises are a relatively small source, except in Portugal and Sweden. Thus, on average,
the so-called ‘privatisation’ of sports finance is due more to household consumption than
to the financial commitment of enterprises, with Switzerland as an extreme case.
271
C
o
p
y
r
i
g
h
t
2
0
0
6
.
E
d
w
a
r
d
E
l
g
a
r
P
u
b
l
i
s
h
i
n
g
.
A
l
l
r
i
g
h
t
s
r
e
s
e
r
v
e
d
.
M
a
y
n
o
t
b
e
r
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
i
n
a
n
y
f
o
r
m
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
p
e
r
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
p
u
b
l
i
s
h
e
r
,
e
x
c
e
p
t
f
a
i
r
u
s
e
s
p
e
r
m
i
t
t
e
d
u
n
d
e
r
U
.
S
.
o
r
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
b
l
e
c
o
p
y
r
i
g
h
t
l
a
w
.
EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 10/29/2024 9:09 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY
AN: 182123 ; Wladimir Andreff, Stefan Szymanski.; Handbook on the Economics of Sport
Account: liberty.main.ehost
This means that a European model of sports finance (Andreff, 1996) is deeply rooted
in the chosen spending of households, which is the logic of a market economy where par-
ticipants and spectators are considered to be consumers of sports goods and services.
Nevertheless, in this model, public finance is not negligible, in particular with regard to
local authority funding. This is one of the reasons why the financing of sport by private
business remains limited in Europe compared to North America.
Unfortunately, no update of the Council of Europe’s survey is available so far. However,
in 2000, France and the UK seem to be representative of a more general European trend.
The share of households still increases in sports finance while the share of public (both
central and local) financing decreases. The public–private finance distribution is moving
towards a higher inflow of private money in sport.
Private Sports Finance
Households finance the sports goods industry through their purchases of sportswear,
sports footwear, and more specific sports goods. Some also buy the products of the sport-
ing press, which draws its revenues from them. On the other hand, households finance a
wide range of services supplied by various organisations involved in sporting activities:
subscriptions and fees as sports participants, admissions to sporting events as sports fans,
and bets in sport-related gambling as punters. The aforementioned European survey
showed that household expenditure was more concentrated on financing sports services
than sports goods, in most developed European countries (except Denmark and Sweden),
in 1990 (Table 25.2). On the other hand, households spent more money on buying sports
goods than on the acquisition of sports services in the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Portugal. In some countries, such as the UK, Italy and Sweden, betting and gambling on
272 Handbook on the economics of sport
Table 25.1 The structure of sports finance in Europe, 1990 (2000) (%)
Country Households Enterprises Central Local Private Public Overall
government government sector sector finance/
GDP
1990
Czech Republic 74.8 1.8 6.0 17.4 76.6 23.4 n.a.
Denmark 55.6 5.6 6.3 32.5 61.2 38.8 0.56
Finland 66.2 4.8 4.3 24.7 71.0 29.0 1.13
France 42.4 8.5 11.5 37.6 50.9 49.1 1.10
Germany 69.0 3.8 0.6 26.6 72.8 27.2 1.28
Hungary 47.5 5.7 30.2 16.6 53.2 46.8 0.60
Italy 72.9 7.9 8.2 11.0 80.8 19.2 1.04
Portugal 36.5 42.0 9.9 11.6 78.5 21.5 1.77
Sweden 60.2 17.1 2.2 20.4 77.4 22.6 0.80
Switzerland 91.6 2.8 0.4 5.2 94.4 5.6 3.47
UK 79.1 5.0 0.8 15.1 84.1 15.9 1.49
20
00
France 50.4 7.0 11.1 31.5 57.4 42.6 1.70
UK 79.5 8.4 n.a. 12.1 87.9 12.1 1.50
Sources: Andreff et al. (1994), MJS (2002) and Cambridge Econometrics (2003).
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:09 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
the outcome of sporting events account for a substantial share of the private finance
flowing into the sports economy. The methodological tricks backing these figures (see
Andreff et al., 1994) do not allow more refined conclusions to be formulated.
With regard to the enterprise contribution to private sport finance, sponsorship has
usually been the biggest source of funds, namely in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy and Sweden, followed by the broadcasting rights fees paid by television
companies. Today, the 10 major sponsors of French sport spend an average of more than
€10 million per year on sports sponsorship (Andreff and Nys, 2002). The broadcasting
rights fees that accrued to all sports, in 1998, reached $451 million in France, $841 million
in Germany, $500 million in Italy, $261 million in Spain and $791 million in the UK.
Football received the major share of television revenues: 37.8 per cent in France, 42 per
cent in Germany, 65.2 per cent in Italy, 50.8 per cent in Spain and 51.6 per cent in the UK.2
After football, the main sports benefiting from the television windfall were Formula One
(9.3 per cent of all broadcasting right fees), rugby (8.1%), tennis (4.6%) and cycling (2.7%)
in France; tennis (6.6%), Formula One (6.2%), boxing (4.3%) and basketball (3.5%) in
Germany; Formula One (7.4%), basketball (5.1%) and cycling (2.0%) in Italy; basketball
(10.9%), tennis (9.8%), Formula One (4.2%) and track and fields (1.4%) in Spain;
and rugby (11.7%), cricket (7.9%), Formula One (4.5%) and tennis (2.3%) in the UK. The
share of sport sponsorship, compared to broadcasting rights fees, has decreased in the
past 20 years in Europe. Both are somewhat volatile sources of sports financing, since it
Sport and financing 273
Table 25.2 The share of sports goods and services in household consumption, 1990
(2000) (%)
Country Sportswear Other Subscriptions Admissions Newspapers Other Betting &
& footwear sports insurance, media sports gambling
goods fees services
1990
Belgium 13.2 19.2 24.3 9.0 27.0 7.3
Czech 86.9* 12.4** 0.7
Republic
Denmark 26.8 24.9 48.3**
Finland 25.8 10.1 10.2 46.5 7.4
France 25.6 12.5 7.4 7.8 4.0 42.7
Germany 22.6 14.7 12.4 14.0 5.9 29.1 1.3
Hungary 56.9* 3.1 34.7 5.3
Italy 33.7 3.5 13.1 4.7 6.4 9.8 28.8
Portugal 53.7* 38.9 7.4
Spain 22.0* 16.4 61.6
Sweden 39.1 19.5 14.7 1.5 25.2
UK 20.2 21.1 5.5 14.8 4.8 4.3 29.2
2000
France 25.5 34.3 16.8 11.6 11.8
UK 21.6 6.9 23.5 5.2 20
.1
Note: * All sports goods; ** All sports services.
Sources: Calculated from Andreff et al. (1994), MJS (2002) and Cambridge Econometrics (2003).
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:09 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
is not the basic enterprise calling to finance sports, except for those firms involved in the
production and trade of sports goods and services.
A minor private source of finance flows through sport at the workplace supported
by employers’ money, which is a non-negligible share of overall private funds in
Scandinavian sports. Sports financing by enterprises was a multiple of the state budget for
sports in Finland, Germany, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK, in 1990, while
it amounted to less than 50 per cent of the state budget in the Czech Republic and
Hungary. The data available for two countries in 2000 do not show a precise trend.
Public Sports Finance
In federal and community states (Germany, Switzerland, the UK and Scandinavian
states), the central government budget for sports is rather limited, in absolute terms and
compared to other sources of sports financing. A more centralised administration of
sports in France, Italy, Portugal and Hungary (and to a lesser extent the Czech Republic)
results in a more significant share of the state budget in the overall sports finance. In some
countries, central government financing is completed with receipts coming from betting
and gambling: the French (extra-budget state fund) Fonds National de Développement
du Sport collects funds from the gamblers’ stakes in the Loto sportif and the Loto
national, the Italian National Olympic Committee receives revenues from the Totocalcio
football pools and other gambling and the Enalotto lottery, in Germany sports feder-
ations benefit from funds collected by Lotto, Toto-Ergebniswette, Toto-Auswahlwette,
Glückspirale, Spiel 77 and Rennquintett, and a National Lottery was created in 1994 in
the UK with part of its income earmarked for the Sports Council finance.
Although the share of local authorities decreased in France and the UK between 1990
and 2000, the major sources of public sports finance are still the local governments of
municipalities, districts (the German Länder, the Swiss cantons, the French départe-
ments, the Belgian provinces and the English counties) and regions. In all surveyed coun-
tries, the local government share in overall sports finance is larger than the state budget
for sports. In some countries, the gambling revenues flow into sport through local bodies,
as in Switzerland where 75 per cent of the Sport-Toto net profit is paid to the cantons
which are obliged to use these moneys for the construction of sports facilities and the
financial aid to sport for all. Generally local governments finance sports facilities more
than the central government and private enterprises do, in all countries. However, subsi-
dies to local sports clubs are a major expenditure in local governments’ sports budgets,
and this source of revenue may be extremely important for (the survival of) some small
amateur clubs. Local authorities distribute subsidies according to pre-established crite-
ria such as the level of competition, the club’s performances, the number of participants
(or the number of teams registered in various competitions), the age distribution of par-
ticipants, and the club’s real costs and revenues. In May 2001, the European Commission
limited the annual amount of the allowed local subsidy to a single professional club to
€2.3 million.
The Distribution of the Funds Allocated to Sport
The funds that finance the sports economy partly flow into the sports goods industry
and trade. Another bigger part is used to finance the sports administration structures
(federations, clubs), and through them sports practice and competitions, including
274 Handbook on the economics of sport
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:09 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
top-level sport, while some funds finance sports facilities and the organisation of sport-
ing events.
No country has so far been able to carry out, on an annual basis, a comprehensive
survey of all the moneys invested in the organisation of sporting events by the country’s
sports administration structures and private enterprises. The European survey cited above
provides an estimation of how sports finance was distributed, with the exception of sport-
ing events (Table 25.3). In all sampled countries, in 1990, sports federations and sports
clubs together accounted for the great bulk of funds entering sport, from 42.2 per cent of
all the funds allocated in Sweden to 91.7 per cent in the UK. The distribution of funds
among sports administration structures, between federations and clubs, is not very
significant, since it depends on the specific accounting methodology and the degree of
centralisation of sports structures in each country. With regard to the funds devoted to
top-level sport, the existing data is very heterogeneous and, in most countries, covers only
the public financing of top-level athletes and teams. The only data available for sports
facilities on a nationwide basis relates to their public financing; no aggregated figure is
available for private financing of sports facilities. In 1990, the latter attracted the highest
share of public finance in Scandinavian countries, France and Germany (where the gov-
ernment invested heavily in refurbishing sports facilities in eastern Länder after the
German reunification).
Regional Sports Financing
Sports financing is increasingly a local and regional issue in Europe since it is unevenly
allocated between the different regions of a country. At a regional level, the overwhelm-
ing share of finance comes from the expenditures of local households. For instance,
households provide nearly 20 times more money than the central government grants to
sports in English regions (Table 25.4) and over 200 times more than local government
grants. The English case shows that households’ sport-related spending ranged from £198
per capita per year in the South West to £266 in the South East. Local government grants
are also unevenly distributed (from almost nothing in the North East to £3.9 per capita
Sport and financing 275
Table 25.3 Distribution of sport finance, 1990 (%)
Country Federations Clubs Facilities Top level
Czech Republic 15.9 63.5 12.7 7.9
Denmark 6.7 47.8 43.2 2.3
Finland 17.6 36.1 31.4 14.9
France 22.6 31.6 44.0 1.8
Germany 4.3 40.9 53.5 1.3
Hungary 32.1 21.7 34.1 12.1
Portugal 5.8 84.5 9.1 0.6
Sweden 6.0 36.2 57.7 0.1
Switzerland 20.1 53.8 25.5 0.6
UK 85.3 6.4 8.4 n.a.
Source: Estimation based on non-comprehensive data, see Andreff et al. (1994).
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:09 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
276
T
ab
le
2
5.
4
S
po
rt
s
fi
na
nc
in
g
by
t
he
p
ub
lic
s
ec
to
r
an
d
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
in
E
ng
lis
h
re
gi
on
s,
20
00
£
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
%
o
f
ov
er
al
l s
pe
nd
in
g
C
en
tr
al
g
ov
t
L
oc
al
g
ov
t
H
ou
se
ho
ld
Sp
or
ts
w
ea
r
Sp
or
ts
g
oo
ds
Su
bs
cr
ip
ti
on
s,
fe
es
A
dm
is
si
on
f
ee
s
G
am
bl
in
g
gr
an
ts
gr
an
ts
sp
en
di
ng
fo
ot
w
ea
r
L
on
do
n
13
.4
3.
9
24
2
24
.3
5.
3
25
.5
5.
7
18
.1
So
ut
h
E
as
t
13
.1
0.
3
26
6
20
.2
7.
0
25
.9
5.
8
17
.4
E
as
t
12
.9
0.
4
21
5
22
.8
5.
1
23
.3
5.
2
19
.5
So
ut
h
W
es
t
11
.8
1.
5
19
8
20
.7
10
.
1
22
.1
4.
9
18
.9
W
es
t
M
id
la
nd
s
13
.6
1.
7
23
0
19
.9
12
.2
21
.4
4.
8
20
.6
E
as
t
M
id
la
nd
s
12
.8
1.
1
20
7
20
.8
6.
3
20
.6
4.
6
20
.7
Y
or
ks
&
H
um
be
rs
id
e
15
.1
1.
2
22
9
21
.1
4.
8
25
.2
5.
6
22
.4
N
or
th
W
es
t
12
.5
0.
1
22
6
21
.8
6.
6
24
.0
5.
3
20
.3
N
or
th
E
as
t
14
.3
0.
0
22
8
22
.1
4.
1
15
.1
3.
4
32
.8
E
ng
la
nd
13
.2
1.
2
23
0
21
.6
6.
9
23
.5
5.
2
20
.1
S
ou
rc
e:
C
am
br
id
ge
E
co
no
m
et
ri
cs
(
20
03
).
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:09 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
in London) whereas central government grants to regions are less uneven (from £11.8 per
capita in the South West to £15.1 in Yorkshire and Humberside).
It is generally the case that the purchase of sportswear and sport-related subscriptions
and fees each account for about 20–25 per cent of all household sport-related spending,
in English regions. Admission fees average about 5 per cent of sport-related expenditures,
the North East being the only region well below average. The share of household expen-
ditures for sports goods and gambling is more uneven across regions.
In France, only a few regions publish detailed data on sports financing. For example,
in the Midi-Pyrénées region, roughly one-third of funds flowing into regional sports
leagues comes from public grants and subsidies. Enterprises provide a smaller share in
financing regional sports than in supporting nationwide sports development. Households
are the major source of sports finance in the Midi-Pyrénées (59 per cent of the total).
Overall sports finance is distributed by regional leagues, first for paying salaries, then for
covering the cost of organising sporting events, their own management costs, the purchase
of sports goods and the building and maintenance of sports facilities and, finally, trans-
portation costs (Table 25.5).
Sport Submitted to a Purely Financial Rationale?
It is neither abnormal nor amoral that money should circulate in sport, in quantities
sufficient to develop sports participation and spectacle. Commercial companies, associa-
tions and the media have found an interest in financing sporting spectacles and the com-
mercial use of sporting images. Such trends prompt sports organisations (clubs, leagues
and federations), which began with non-profit objectives, to transform themselves into
commercial associations, and sometimes shareholding companies. Rising amounts of
money and growing temptations bring in a risk of embezzlements and fund diversion, in
particular in the best-endowed sports, unless the sports governance structures are
strengthened. The growth of private sources of finance upsets the structures of European
mass sport, notably federations and clubs. Both favour and support the development of
new and, sometimes, parallel competitions. The more commercial sponsors finance these
competitions, the more the federations’ governance over sport is undermined. Federations
have usually reacted with an attempt to supervise the revenues derived from sporting
events under their control (or ownership), in order to avoid any unmonitored leakage of
Sport and financing 277
Table 25.5 The finance of all sports leagues in the Midi-Pyrénées, 2001 (%)
Finance from: Expenditure on:
Public subsidies central 32.2 Salaries and related expenditures 21.6
& local governments Transportation 2.8
Enterprises (sponsors) 1.5 Sport events 13.9
Households: Sport facilities & goods 10.3
Admission fees 13.5 Management 13.3
Other services 45.5 Other expenditures 38.1
Other finance 7.3
Source: Maudet and Coste (2003).
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:09 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
power and money to commercial decision makers. In any case, sports federations have
increasingly been involved in commercial and financial schemes over the whole range of
sporting activities, which are nowadays regarded primarily as an act of individual con-
sumption.
Attracting new membership has become a competitive challenge among the various
sports federations and clubs, and it increasingly implies a marketing approach to attract
more ‘customers’. In the search for increased finance, most sports organisations have
moved towards commercialisation and professional management, but often without
required monitoring and regulation as far as accountability and internal audit are con-
cerned. In less professional sports, the influx of money lacks transparency, and sometimes
has led to financial crises (Andreff, 2000). There has been a demand for hiring professional
waged managers even in small federations, paying salaries to federation chairmen in order
to fight illegal payments from ‘secret funds’, and isolating commercial operations (sports
shows) from mass sporting activities. The problem is that, just as sport for all is necessary
to preserve the credibility of sporting values, the sporty image ‘for all’ is necessary to
maintain the attractiveness of sport to those who invest in it for commercial purposes. On
the other hand, the penetration of major financial interests in European sports carries
some risks with it. Above all, sports shows are staged to make money, not the reverse.
Another emerging risk is one of the media and sponsors taking over the financing and
possibly organisational power lost by sports federations, that is, a profound change in the
less business-orientated European sport (compared to North America). That the amount
of financial inflows determines sport performances is not a new concern with major sport-
ing events, but the involvement of increasing financial interests adds to the risks that
match fixing, corruption and other distortions may escalate uncontrollably. For example,
there is a statistical correlation between the frequency of wins and the size of team
budgets, namely in European football (Andreff and Bourg, 2006).
Sports Finance in the Face of a Sporting Ethic
A sporting ethic refers to moral values regarding sports practice as a socially useful
endeavour likely to breed sportsmen and -women imbued with: a fighting spirit; a sense
of fair play; a sense of healthy well-being; an anti-doping attitude; a desire for technical
and aesthetic beauty in sports practice; a recognition of the equality and fellowship of
human beings (when entering the arena); and a strong urge to surpass oneself. Sport is
even thought of as a spiritual experience and a deontology (for sport professionals). In
this respect, for the last 100 years or so, the European sporting ethic has encompassed a
behavioural rationale, a sporting spirit, and a lack of (or marginal) interest in financial
matters. When the sport–finance relationships grow and flourish, there is a risk that the
financial rationale will supersede the sporting ethic. When it becomes imperative to earn
money by any means, then all means appear to be acceptable for winning competitions,
such wins being the source of direct (prizes and bonuses) and indirect (publicity fees,
broadcasting rights fees, and sponsorship) finance. If finance is allowed to dictate sport-
ing practice, competition and events, non-ethical behaviour is likely to spread to all sports.
Is that to say that finance alone is responsible for all sport perversions? Certainly not.
However, the ever-more internationalised financing of sport, if unregulated, could down-
grade its ethical sense and embroil it in adjusting sporting rules of the game to make them
more ‘finance-friendly’. With a more globalised profit-seeking money inflow in sport, the
278 Handbook on the economics of sport
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:09 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
borderline is increasingly blurred between finance-friendly adjustments and cheating,
match fixing, falsification of records and accounts, corruption, embezzlement, rigged
games, illegal gambling, under-the-table transfers of dubious capital, illegal transfers of
teenage athletes (Andreff, 2004), and even money laundering (see examples in Andreff,
2000).3 The most undesirable effect of non-ethical practices might well jeopardise the
sports financing itself, since they might ‘kill the hen that lays the golden eggs’.
Financing Sports Business in North America
The business orientation of North American sports is financial. The driving force behind
the money influx into the American sports business is that both individual and team
sports are basically professional sports.4 Finance is nearly always the counterpart of a
market transaction between professional sports and households and enterprises. One
major source of finance in most North American sports simply relies on selling their
‘products’, that is, admission fees, gate receipts and stadium revenues (30–60 per cent of
the overall finance, depending on the sports league) paid by those households (or indi-
viduals) who are sports fans.
The second source of finance consists in enterprises’ funds poured into sports through
advertising (stadium-related revenues including corporate boxes, concessions and naming
rights), sponsorship (licensing income) and media revenues (broadcasting rights fees).
The top 20 advertising companies involved in sport provided $1876.3 million to American
sports in 2000 (Fort, 2003) – from Anheuser-Busch, Chevrolet, Ford, Visa, IBM, Coors,
Miller, Nike, Coca-Cola, AT&T, Microsoft, McDonald’s and so on. Sports that basically
benefit from this money influx are major professional sports (and leagues), namely the
National Basketball Association, the National Hockey League, Motorsports, Pro Golf,
Major League Baseball and Pro Tennis. Sponsorship provides finance to both individual
and team sports. Sports sponsorship has recently grown into an explicit big business. In
addition to sponsoring events and individual teams, many very large firms now purchase
the right to have their name attached to stadiums and arenas to enhance their advertising
(Philips and the Atlanta arena for $9.2 million per year, Pepsi and the Denver Center for
$3.4 million, Enron and the Houston Field for $3.3 million and so on). Sponsorship rights
fees commonly go to the primary tenant of a sports facility, usually the tenant team
owner. Media ownership of teams also provides a source of sports finance, often with a
bigger financial support for those teams owned by media. With the exception of the
National Football League, corporations can own teams outright, and some corporate
owners are media companies (TBS, News Corp., ABC, ESPN). Other owners of profes-
sional sports teams are some of America’s wealthiest individuals (see Leeds and von
Allmen, 2002, p. 71).
League expansion and relocation also attract finance in American sports. The league
expansion increases the number of teams, yields franchise rights fees from new owners,
inflates gate receipts of member teams, and increases the league television rights values
(and further broadcasting rights). Team relocation to a more profitable place inflates the
league’s finances. Expansion and relocation can be carefully managed in order to enhance
the bargaining power of team owners with their host cities and, thus, inflate public subsi-
dies and keep the price of franchises high. Public subsidies take the form of new stadiums
and arenas provided by local authorities and, thus, financed by taxpayers or by issuing
(state) bonds (ibid.). The total bill for 29 professional sport facilities that opened over the
Sport and financing 279
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:09 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
1999–2003 period would be about $8.9 billion, of which the public share would average
about 64 per cent, or roughly $5.7 billion (Fort, 2003). Since the early 1970s, cities, coun-
tries or states have subsidised sports team owners in this way. Subsidies are not limited to
stadium construction. Some host cities subsidise streets near the stadium, water and sewer
services, match-day safety and crowd control services. Moreover, the stadium and its oper-
ations are often exempt from property taxes, another source of public subsidy. Stadium
leases grant generous revenues and low rent to the team owners as a subsidy. Recent new
stadiums and arenas, have absorbed public funds in the range of $100–400 million ($404
million for the Cincinnati Bengals, 100 per cent publicly financed, $390 million of public
funds for the New York Mets out of an overall bill of $500 million and so on). The states
increasingly rely on the funds gathered through lotteries to finance stadiums and arenas.
Let us now turn to the finance of college sports. In addition to outside revenues listed
below, college sport receives institutional support: a university typically spends money on
athletics departments. Thus, one of the raging controversies in intercollegiate athletics
concerns whether athletics departments represent a profit centre or a drain on college
resources. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) sponsors surveys of
college team finance which show revenue averages that are in the tens of millions of
dollars. Division IA programmes are profitable, far more than lower division programmes
(ibid.). Division IA athletics departments rely on football and, to a lesser extent, men’s
basketball profits to subsidise other programmes: 75 per cent of schools make a profit in
both football and men’s basketball (Sheehan, 2000a). In 1999, the average total revenue
of Division IA college athletics departments was $22 million, $67 million in Division IA
college football departments, $23 million in basketball departments, and $5 million in
other sports. In college sports, conferences negotiate contracts with media providers. The
total value of these contracts signed by college football – the Atlantic Coast conference,
the Big East conference, the Big Ten/Pac-10, the Southern conference and Notre Dame –
with ABC, CBS, NBC and ESPN was $373 million per year, in 1996–2000 (Zimbalist,
1999). Such an amount is slightly below the lowest revenue earned by the National
Hockey League.
Sponsorship has become widespread in college sports. Every college team attracts
money in selling advertising space on its uniform to companies such as Nike, Reebok,
Adidas and so on. Conference championships are sponsored by enterprises for millions
of dollars. Colleges are selling stadium and arena naming rights as well, up to $40 million
over 23 years obtained by Fresno State College for the Save Mart Center and $20 million
over 25 years secured by the University of Maryland for the Comcast Center (Fort, 2003).
Firms have recently become much more interested in sponsoring the college football Bowl
Championship series. Post-season money is now a mainstay at the conference level (the
average bowl revenue per conference is nearly a quarter of a conference’s broadcasting
rights fees). Finally, a few colleges require alumni to contribute a minimum amount (for
example, $100) to the university’s general fund in order to be eligible to purchase football
tickets (which is an indirect football-generated revenue).
Just as in some European amateur sports, cheating on NCAA rules (agreement on not
paying athletes) has developed, since it can be worth millions of dollars and coincides with
the profit-maximising strategy of nearly all universities. A challenging view (Leeds and
von Allmen, 2002) is that the athletics directors and coaches, in fact, maximise budgets
rather than profits, and minimise costs of production by depressing the ‘pay’ of their most
280 Handbook on the economics of sport
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:09 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
valuable resource – the athletes themselves – due to the monopsony power of the NCAA
on the very specific ‘labour market’ of college athletes. Some contend that revenues in
college sports appear to be largely driven by expenses (Sheehan, 2000b). In college foot-
ball, a $1 increase in expenditures generates approximately $1 in additional revenue, while
it increases revenues by $0.25–0.35 in other sports. If a school wants to keep throwing
money at football, on average it will be no worse off, but following this strategy must be
based on a desire to win rather than on profit maximisation. An additional problem is that
athletics directors subsidise non-revenue men’s sports, such as tennis, golf or Olympic
sports, and women’s sports (whose participants are disproportionately white and middle
income) with the money earned from the revenue sports (football, men’s basketball) whose
participants are disproportionately black and poor. It is not the least surprising windfall
of the professionalisation of college sports.
Notes
1. See Chapter 76.
2. See Chapter 76.
3. See Chapters 85 and 86.
4. See chapter 76.
References
Andreff, W. (1996), ‘Economic environment of sport: a comparison between Western Europe and Hungary’,
European Journal of Sport Management, 2 (2), 28–38.
Andreff, W. (2000), ‘Financing modern sport in the face of a sporting ethic’, European Journal of Sport
Management, 7 (1), 5–30.
Andreff, W. (2004), ‘The taxation of player moves from developing countries’, in R.D. Fort and J. Fizel (eds),
International Sports Economics Comparisons, Westport, CT: Greenwood.
Andreff, W. and J.-F. Bourg (2006), ‘Broadcasting rights and competition in European football’, in
C. Jeanrenaud and S. Késenne (eds), Sports and the Media, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward
Elgar.
Andreff, W., J.-F. Bourg, B. Halba and J.-F. Nys (1994), ‘The economic importance of sport in Europe: financing
and economic impact’, Background document of the 14th Informal Meeting of European Sports Ministers,
Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 28–29 April.
Andreff, W. and J.-F. Nys (2002), Économie du sport, Que sais-je? no. 2294, Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France.
Cambridge Econometrics (2003), ‘The value of the sports economy in England: a study on behalf of Sport
England’, Sport England, June.
Fort, R.D. (2003), Sports Economics, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Leeds, M. and P. von Allmen (2002), The Economics of Sports, Boston, MA: Pearson Education.
Maudet, T. and F. Coste (2003), ‘Les budgets des ligues et des comités régionaux sportifs en Midi-Pyrénées’,
Revue Juridique et Économique du Sport, no. 68, September, 61–78.
MJS (2002), Sports STAT-Info, no. 02-03, Ministère de la Jeunesse et des Sports, September.
Sheehan, R.G. (2000a), ‘Academics, athletics and finances’, in W.S. Kern (ed.), The Economics of Sports,
Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 75–91.
Sheehan, R.G. (2000b), ‘The professionalization of college sports’, in J. Losco and B.L. Fife (eds), Higher
Education in Transition: The Challenges of the New Millennium, Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey, 133–58.
Zimbalist, A. (1999), Unpaid Professionals: Commercialism and Conflict in Big-time College Sports, Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sport and financing 281
EBSCOhost – printed on 10/29/2024 9:09 AM via LIBERTY UNIVERSITY. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use
Expert paper writers are just a few clicks away
Place an order in 3 easy steps. Takes less than 5 mins.